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Against a backdrop of state constitutional and legislative initiatives aimed 
at limiting judicial use of international law, this Article argues that state 
judges have, by and large, interpreted treaties and customary international 
law so as to narrow their effect on state law-making prerogatives. Where 
state judges have used international law more liberally, they have done so 
to give effect to state executive and legislative objectives. Not only does this 
thesis suggest that the trend among state legislatures to limit state judges’ 
use of international law is self-defeating, it also gives substance to a 
relatively unexplored structural safeguard of federalism: state judges’ 
authority under the Supremacy Clause to harmonize treaties and customary 
international law with state constitutional, legislative, and common law, 
and to influence federal jurisprudence on the scope and effect of binding 
international law. The Supremacy Clause empowers state judges to adapt 
international law to maximize benefits for— and minimize disruptions to—
state policy objectives. As more areas of traditional state authority are 
displaced by international law, state judicial management of international 
law may be the strongest structural protection for state interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For most of American history, U.S. states have maintained an 
ambivalent relationship with international law. After they successfully 
cooperated in their military rejection of British rule, the states welcomed 
the attributes of sovereignty transferred to them under the law of nations as 
it existed in 1783.1 In the early post-war period, however, the states used 
 
 1.  Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1446 (1987) (“The 
colonies united to declare their independence, but their Declaration proclaimed them to be ‘free and 
independent states’ . . . . Under traditional jurisprudence, sovereign states could enter into treaties with 
one another, and might even join together in a perpetual federation, or league, without losing their 
sovereign status . . . . This sort of federation by mutual treaty was exactly what the Revolutionaries had 
in mind when they created the Articles [of Confederation].”) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776)); Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: 
International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 1027, 1050-51 (2002) (“Because state 
legislatures—not Congress—were the original repositories of legislative sovereignty transferred from 
Parliament by revolution, the dogma of exclusive sovereignty (in thirteen iterations) stood as an 
impediment to the creation of a ‘more perfect Union.’”); Julian Yap, State Sovereign Immunity and the 
Law of Nations: Incorporating a Commercial Act Exception into Eleventh Amendment Sovereign 
Immunity, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 81, 105 (2009) (“Thus, under the law of nations, each individual state was 
regarded as a full sovereign entity in its own right, retaining all sovereign attributes that it had not 
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their sovereign powers in ways that strained the unity of the new 
confederation.2 
 
After the War for Independence, [t]he “States passed tariff laws against 
one another as well as against foreign nations; and, indeed, as far as 
commerce was concerned, each State treated the others as foreign 
nations. There were retaliations, discriminations, and every manner of 
trade restrictions and impediments which local ingenuity and selfishness 
could devise.” Disputes between the States over border lands and 
overlapping land grants generated as much, if not more, hostility . . . 
including periodic border skirmishes between settlers from different 
States. And conflicting claims to lucrative prize ships and spoils of war 
seized on the high seas were yet another source of high tension among 
the States.3 
 
 Although the Articles of Confederation prohibited states from 
entering into any “agreement, alliance or treaty” with foreign powers and, 
separately, provided that “no two or more States shall enter into any treaty, 
confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of 
[Congress],”4 the states regarded the Articles themselves as a treaty among 
sovereigns.5 As a treaty, the Articles gave neither Congress nor individual 
states effective remedies against breaches. When the constitutional drafters 
met to correct these and other problems caused by the Articles of 
Confederation, they determined states should relinquish more sovereign 
attributes in the transition from confederation to national republic, although 
 
expressly surrendered, including that of sovereign immunity in another sovereign's courts.”) (citations 
omitted). Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[T]he States' immunity from suit is a 
fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the 
Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union 
upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain 
constitutional Amendments.”). It was around the time of the American Revolution that the term 
“international law” began to replace the “law of nations,” a change attributed to Jeremy Bentham. See 
generally Mark W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of “International Law”, 78 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 405 (1984). 
 2.  Amar, supra note 1, at 1447-48 (“Various states refused to honor requisitions, flouted official 
judgments in the very limited category of controversies committed to central courts, enacted laws 
repudiating earlier treaties entered into by Congress, waged unauthorized local wars against Indian 
tribes, conducted negotiations with foreign nations independently of Congress, and maintained standing 
armies without congressional permission – all in clear violation of the Articles.”). 
 3.  Lee, supra note 1, at 1055 (citation omitted). 
 4.  ACT OF CONFEDERATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (NOV. 15, 1777), reprinted in 1 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 86, 93 (Merrill Jensen ed., 
1976). 
 5.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279-80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(arguing that the Articles of Confederation were a treaty within the context of the ratification debates). 
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the precise extent of that surrender remains unclear.6 The U.S. Constitution 
largely allocated recognition, formation, and domestic effect of 
international law to Congress and the President, leaving somewhat 
diminished “political safeguards of federalism” to protect state interests 
when Congress defined or codified customary international law, or when 
the President’s diplomatic agents entered into treaty negotiations. 
Due in part to the ambiguities surrounding the redistribution of 
sovereign power under the U.S. Constitution, individual states, primarily 
through their legislatures, repeatedly attempted to assert their authority 
over both customary international law and ratified treaties to limit their 
influence or preserve state law-making prerogatives.7 Federal courts 
invalidated many of these attempts, applying one of several doctrines of 
conflict or field preemption flowing from Article VI of the U.S. 
Constitution.8 In the last decade, state governments have discovered that 
even legal regimes traditionally regarded as well within their constitutional 
domain may be subject to federal judicial veto as a result of a conflict with 
customary international law, presidential flexibility in the conduct of 
foreign affairs or even treaties the U.S. has not ratified.9 
A new flashpoint has emerged as state legislatures again respond to 
the increasing influence of international law: state judiciaries. In the past 
year, Oklahoma adopted a constitutional amendment prohibiting its state 
judges from “considering” international law; the Arizona and Wyoming 
legislatures introduced similar constitutional amendments; and, more than 
20 state legislatures considered “anti-international law proposals.”10 These 
 
 6.  Carlos M. Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2159 (1999) 
(“[V]iolations of treaties by the states were a major problem during the period of the Articles of 
Confederation. . . . [T]he Articles were widely perceived to be flawed because they did not provide for 
the enforcement of treaties against the states. . . . [T]his was a key reason for the Framers' decision to 
draft a new Constitution. . . . [T]he state courts failed to enforce treaties during this period because, 
adhering to the British rule, they understood that treaties were not enforceable in court without 
legislative implementation.”); see also Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 741, 760 n.81 (2010) (noting disagreement over the scope of the states’ ability to conclude 
international agreements under the Articles of Confederation and the U.S. Constitution).  
 7.  Fla. Stat. § 901.26 (2011) (“Failure to provide consular notification under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations or other bilateral consular conventions shall not be a defense in any 
criminal proceeding against any foreign national and shall not be cause for the foreign national’s 
discharge from custody.”); see, e.g., Tim Wu, Treaties' Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 584 n.31 (2007) 
(listing cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court determined state statutes conflicted with treaties).  
 8.  See Wu, supra note 7, at 584-85. 
 9.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (striking down Missouri statute 
authorizing death sentence for convicted persons under 18 years of age) (“As respondent and a number 
of amici emphasize, Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
every country in the world has ratified save for the United States and Somalia, contains an express 
prohibition on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under 18.”). 
 10.  S. Con. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); H.R.J. Res. HJ0008, 61st Leg., 
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initiatives proceed under presumptions held by many state legislators (and 
voters) that 1) politically unaccountable federal judges resort to otherwise 
non-binding international law to resolve disputes that are properly the 
province of U.S. or state law and 2) state judges emulate this behavior. Rex 
Duncan, the principal author of Oklahoma’s constitutional amendment, 
State Question 755, stated that he introduced the measure as a “preemptive 
strike” aimed at preventing Oklahoma judges from mimicking federal 
judges who, “increasingly embrac[e] the idea that federal courts should 
look to international law to settle U.S. cases.”11 
Acknowledging that the first presumption—that federal judges 
illegitimately apply international law to resolve disputes—is the subject of 
considerable controversy,12 this Article challenges the second presumption. 
It is true that legal historians largely agree that the Framers included the 
Supremacy Clause precisely because they believed state judges would 
privilege local interests over the national interest, especially its diplomatic 
or international component.13 However, the relevance of this Article is not 
just to dispute prevailing suspicions that state judges improperly apply 
international law. The greater contribution is to explore the subtler ways in 
which state judges wield the Supremacy Clause, rather than wrestle with its 
constraints. I argue that state judges have regularly used their authority 
under the Supremacy Clause to shape both U.S. treaties and customary 
 
Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011), available at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2011/Introduced/HJ0008.pdf&pli=1; 
Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma and Beyond: Understanding the Wave of State Anti-
Transnational Law Initiatives, 87 IND. L.J. 1, 2 n.9 (Supp. 2011) (listing legislative initiatives). 
 11.  Bill Sherman, Legislator’s Proposal Would Ban Use of Sharia Law, TULSA WORLD, July 18, 
2010, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=14&articleid=20100718_18_A1_ 
Viewsd561266.  
 12.  Scholars are divided on whether federal judges generally welcome or reject international law. 
See, e.g., Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 405, 428 (Supp. 1997) (“Very little, if any, ‘new’ international human rights law has been 
incorporated in decisions by federal judges without the aid of a statute, despite a tradition in which 
customary international law is part of U.S. law and treaties are the supreme law of the land.”); Patrick 
M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 5 (1995) (“Over the past 
200 years, United States judges have developed a series of rules and practices that minimize the role of 
international law in domestic litigation.”). Contra Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“We Americans have a method for making the laws that are over us. We elect 
representatives to two Houses of Congress, each of which must enact the new law and present it for the 
approval of a President, whom we also elect. For over two decades now, unelected federal judges have 
been usurping this lawmaking power by converting what they regard as norms of international law into 
American law.”).  
 13. Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi 
and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 843 (2004) (“The 
inclusion of treaties, as well as statutes, in the Supremacy Clause shows the extent to which the 
Constitution's framers focused upon state interferences in foreign affairs under the Articles. Perhaps the 
single greatest foreign affairs challenge under the Articles was that states refused to implement and 
abide by treaties negotiated by the national government.”). 
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international law to advance their states’ administrative and legislative 
objectives.14 Indeed, both the text of Article VI and constitutional history 
suggest that state judges do so.15 Often using customary international law 
as their principal authority, state judges have interpreted treaties to protect 
important state interests like their own citizens’ access to state courts and 
evidence located in foreign jurisdictions; their prosecutors’ flexibility in 
managing criminal cases against foreign aliens; and, their citizens’ 
preferences for private ordering including application of international law 
in their contracts.16 
In some cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected state judges’ 
interpretations of treaties and customary international law where these 
interpretations irreconcilably jeopardized federal interests.17 In others, the 
U.S. Supreme Court adopted state judges’ interpretations as valid and even 
authoritative under an existing treaty regime.18 Where the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not yet decided an issue of treaty or customary international law, 
state judges and federal judges frame relevant issues through an iterative 
dialogue.19 Federal judges rely in part on state judges’ interpretations and 
vice versa. State judges, therefore, influence treaties and customary 
international law through three principal methods: 1) interpreting treaties so 
as to harmonize them as completely as possible with the existing legal 
regime prevailing in a state; 2) influencing federal jurisprudence as to both 
the content and legal significance of customary international law and the 
interpretation of treaties; and, 3) shaping the procedural use of treaties and 
customary international law in state civil and criminal adjudications. 
The practical significance of this argument is that, to the extent states 
seek to preserve their law-making prerogatives in the face of increasingly 
 
 14.  See Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (en banc) (rejecting rights asserted under 
the U.N. Charter). 
 15.  Alison L. LaCroix, Rhetoric and Reality in Early American Legal History: A Reply to Gordon 
Wood, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 749-50 (2011) (“With the negative, Madison attempted to graft a key 
element of imperial practice—hierarchical legislative review—onto the two-tiered structure of the 
Confederation. . . . The delegates’ rejection of the negative, followed immediately by their taking up a 
draft provision directing that ‘the Judiciaries of the several States’ would be ‘bound’ by the ‘supreme 
law’ of the United States, signaled that the institutional focus of federal thought was shifting from 
legislatures to courts.”); Saikrishna Prakash, Are the Judicial Safeguards of Federalism the Ultimate 
Form of Conservative Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1363, 1369-70 (2002) (“A state court 
could only meaningfully ‘question’ the validity of a federal treaty or statute by refusing to enforce such 
a federal law because it was unconstitutional. In other words, Congress understood that the state courts 
would review the constitutionality of federal legislation, at least when state and federal law 
conflicted.”). 
 16.  See infra notes accompanying Parts II-IV. 
 17.  See infra notes accompanying Part II-B. 
 18.  See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk 486 U.S. 694 (1988). 
 19.  See infra notes accompanying Part II-B. 
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influential and pervasive international legal regimes, restricting state 
judges’ ability to use international law is self-defeating. Within the wider 
theoretical literature, this Article contributes to the relatively modest body 
of scholarship dedicated to studying state judges’ use of international law 
in the post-Erie era,20 suggesting that state judges’ ability to harmonize 
treaties and customary international law with state constitutional, statutory 
and common law provides an important judicial safeguard of federalism.21 
This safeguard is especially forceful given that state judges manage 95% of 
all litigation.22 Evidence suggests that a substantial majority of international 
law developments are also handled by state judges,23 and many state judges 
do not “consider themselves bound to follow the decisions of lower federal 
courts on questions of federal law.”24 
Given the structural constraints the U.S. Supreme Court has placed 
upon state executive officials and legislators in directly regulating aspects 
of foreign relations frequently governed by international law, state judges 
may represent the strongest safeguard of federalism in the face of 
 
 20.  Indeed, as far as I know, there is no comprehensive empirical study of state judges’ use of 
international law in the post-Erie era. There are, however, many studies of any individual states’ 
judges’ use of international law. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How States 
Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C.L. REV. 457 (2004); Thomas R. Phillips, State 
Supreme Courts: Local Courts in a Global World, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 557 (2003) (detailing Texas 
judges’ use of international law). There is a robust literature discussing state judges’ interpretation of 
treaties post-ratification, especially the Treaty of Paris and its requirement to protect British assets and 
creditors. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, 
and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2118-19 (1999) (discussing 
proposed reforms of treaty status under U.S. law in the wake of Rutgers); Wythe Holt, "To Establish 
Justice": Politics, The Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
1421, 1441-42, 1458 (noting widespread state refusal to vindicate claims of British creditors against 
U.S. debtors in violation of the Treaty of Paris); Thomas H. Lee, The Safe Conduct Theory of the Alien 
Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 898 (2006) (“State courts, especially those in the biggest debtor 
state, Virginia, had proved spectacularly unhelpful in redressing the debt claims of English creditors. 
This refusal came despite the state courts' obligation under the Supremacy Clause to enforce the debt 
provisions of the 1783 Treaty of Paris.”). 
 21.  Alison LaCroix advances this argument in her excellent study of the judiciary as a solution to 
the philosophical problem of dual sovereigns. ALLISON LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 171-72 (2010) (“To be sure, the clause looked to judges in the states to enforce 
this supreme law of the land. It thus set up a procedural overlap between the two levels of government  
. . . . The judges might be nodes of connection between the functional levels of government, but their 
more significant role was as nodes of separation between the supreme (national, enumerated) law of the 
land and the ordinary (state) law that operated in all other contexts.”). Like many constitutional 
histories, however, hers makes scant reference to the thoughts or practice of state judges at the time. 
 22.  E. Norman Veasey, A Response to Professor Francis E. McGovern’s Paper Entitled Toward 
a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1897, 
1898 (2000). 
 23.  Phillips, supra note 20, at 564 (noting statistics compiled by the Connecticut Bar). 
 24.  Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 1501, 1506 (2006). 
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increasingly influential international law-making.25 Under the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Zschernig v. Miller26 reaffirmed on narrower 
preemption grounds in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi,27 state 
statutes or administrative measures face a significant risk of preemption if 
they impose more than an “incidental effect” on foreign relations, even 
where those statutes do not directly conflict with a treaty or federal 
statute.28 Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Missouri v. Holland, 
the federal government may accomplish through treaty what the 
Constitution otherwise allocates to the states.29 Moreover, the “political 
safeguards of federalism” that arguably protect state interests in the federal 
law-making process are diminished in many international treaty-negotiating 
processes.30 
Whipsawed between international agreements and the customary 
international law those agreements generate on the one hand, and relatively 
unforgiving preemption jurisprudence on the other, state judges’ ability to 
choose among interpretive alternatives represents a key structural safeguard 
for state interests as customary international law as well as bilateral and 
multilateral treaties govern larger areas of legal authority traditionally 
occupied by states.31 Nevertheless, state legislatures are expressing their 
frustration at preemptive federal international law-making not only by 
 
 25.  Indeed, that protection may be significant. The Connecticut Bar Journal, for example, surveys 
international law developments in Connecticut courts. Between 1993 and 2003, 60% of the reported 
decisions were from state courts compared with 40% from district courts or the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit. Phillips, supra note 20, at 564. 
 26.  389 U.S. 429, 433 (1968). 
 27.  539 U.S. 396, 417-20 (2003). 
 28.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000). 
 29.  In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920), the United States Supreme Court decided 
that the federal government’s ability to make treaties, in that case, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, is 
supreme over states’ rights arising under the Tenth Amendment. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The 
Treaty Power and American Federalism Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000). 
 30.  See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 
398, 442 (1998) (“Executive agreements are, quite simply, international agreements concluded by the 
President without the two-thirds senatorial advice and consent specified in Article II of the Constitution. 
. . . The Supreme Court has endorsed the constitutional legitimacy of executive agreements, and it has 
held that even sole executive agreements are supreme federal law and thus supersede inconsistent state 
law. . . . As a number of commentators have pointed out, the treaty and executive agreement process is 
more opaque and less representative than the normal federal legislative process.”) (citations omitted); 
see also generally David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 1963 (2003) (exploring sole executive agreements, Article II treaties, and 
congressional-executive agreements as deserving varying levels of judicial scrutiny to protect 
federalism). For the seminal contribution on the political safeguards of federalism, see generally 
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguard of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition 
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).  
 31.  Cf. Bradley, supra note 23, at 402-09 (describing areas where the federal government may use 
the treaty power to regulate in areas traditionally occupied by the states). 
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attempting to limit state judges’ authority to favorably interpret treaties, use 
customary international law to promote state executive or legislative 
objectives or respect private ordering undertaken by state citizens, but also 
to condemn international law altogether.32 Certain international legal norms 
may in fact subvert or threaten states’ broader schemes to protect citizens 
and promote their interests; other norms may facilitate state efforts to 
provide for the health, prosperity and safety of their citizens. 
Oklahoma is the only state to pass a constitutional amendment 
banning its state judges from applying international law. Using principally, 
but not exclusively, Oklahoma’s experience with both treaties and 
customary international law, this Article investigates the relationship 
between state judges and international law as it applies to traditionally 
state-regulated areas of the law: civil procedure, contracts, criminal law and 
family law. Methodologically, this Article is in part an exercise in 
conventional legal scholarship: the analysis of Oklahoma state appellate 
court decisions and the development of Oklahoma common law. For both 
practical and theoretical reasons, analysis of appellate court decisions does 
not adequately capture the broader state judicial historiography. First, 
Oklahoma courts have not adjudicated cases arising under some of the most 
important private and public international law treaties. Where these gaps 
occur, I have analyzed state court appellate decisions from all 50 states. For 
example, no Oklahoma appellate court has resolved a dispute arising under 
the Hague Convention on Service of Process. Instead, I examine the ways 
in which California and Illinois judges have shaped that treaty’s 
interpretation to favor state interests. Second, appellate or even trial level 
adjudication of private disputes is rare.33 Potential rather than actual 
litigants, or those who act and bargain in the shadow of international law, 
provide key indicators as to how Oklahoma state judges are likely to decide 
issues of first impression given existing statutory and common law rules. 
Therefore, this Article also relies on interviews with Oklahoma attorneys, 
corporate executives, customs agents, police and tribal judges whose lives 
or work may be affected in the unlikely event that the Oklahoma State 
Election Board is permitted to certify State Question 755. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief background to State Question 
755, especially as it fits within the broader debate on state authority to 
 
 32.  Roger Alford, International Law Banned in Oklahoma State Courts, OPINO JURIS, Nov. 3, 
2010, http://opiniojuris.org/2010/11/03/international-law-banned-in-oklahoma-state-courts (“The 
backlash against Lawrence v. Texas, Roper v. Simmons, and Graham v. Florida continues. Or perhaps 
 . . . foreign law and international law are collateral damage.”). 
 33.  See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of 
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1351-88 (1994). 
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make or apply international law. Parts II through V examine state courts’ 
actual and predicted use of international law in areas of traditional state 
regulatory authority: civil procedure, contracts, criminal law and family 
law. Part VI provides a brief conclusion.34 
I. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, STATE JUDGES AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
On November 2, 2010, Oklahoma voters overwhelmingly approved a 
state constitutional amendment which prohibited state judges from 
considering international law when exercising their judicial authority.35 
This measure, formally titled the “Save Our State” amendment or State 
Question 755, if given effect, amends Section 1, Art. VII of Oklahoma’s 
state constitution by inserting the following language: 
 
[State courts], when exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and 
adhere to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the 
Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations 
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma 
Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law 
of another state of the United States provided the law of the other state 
does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts 
shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. 
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international or Sharia Law. 
The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the 
respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.36 
 
Before the Oklahoma State Election Board certified the vote, Muneer 
Awad, a Muslim Oklahoman, challenged the measure principally as it 
affected the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.37 
 
 34.  Not all treaties, of course, introduce these confrontations. The United States, for example, has 
ratified the Convention on the Form of an International Will but has not adopted national implementing 
legislation in favor of state-by-state adoption through the National Conference of Commissioners for 
Uniform State Laws. See President’s Message to Congress Transmitting the Convention Providing a 
Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, 1986 Pub. Papers 905-06 (July 2, 1986) available at 
1973 U.S.T. LEXIS 321. Oklahoma passed an implementing statute in 2010. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §§ 
855-59 (2011). Oklahoma is one of relatively few states to have adopted the Uniform International 
Wills Act.  
 35.  See Trevor Shofner, State Question 755’s Implications Unacceptable, Panel Says, THE 
OKLAHOMA DAILY, Nov. 22, 2010, http://oudaily.com/news/2010/nov/22/state-question-755s-
implications-unacceptable-pane/ (noting 70% approval). 
 36.  Enr. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010). 
 37.  Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th 
Cir. 2012); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction at 6, 13, Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (No. CIV-10-1186-M) 2010 WL 
4455372. 
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Indeed, the “Sharia Law” provision of State Question 755 has drawn as 
much or more of the scholarly and popular criticism as its anti-international 
law provisions.38 A federal district judge in Oklahoma City enjoined the 
Election Board from certifying the measure.39 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on the Establishment Clause 
claim alone.40 Although the case remains alive, the amendment is unlikely 
to ever be implemented.41 
 The episode illustrates in part the extent of certain states’ reactions 
to courts, both in the U.S. and in Europe, deferring to the use of Islamic 
religious norms or principles to adjudicate a range of commercial or family 
disputes.42 State Question 755’s authors explicitly stated that they 
introduced the amendment in response to decisions from British and New 
Jersey judges deferring to certain cultural norms associated, rightly or 
wrongly, with specific Muslim communities.43 Although there is little 
agreement as to the precise content, hermeneutics or boundaries of so-
called “Sharia” law, the episodes in Britain and New Jersey did in fact 
involve Muslims and/or religious jurisprudence.44 
 
 38.  James C. McKinley Jr., Judge Blocks Oklahoma’s Ban on Using Shariah Law in Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/us/30oklahoma.html; Martha F. Davis & 
Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma State Question 755 and an Analysis of Anti-International Law Initiatives, AM. 
CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. AND POL’Y, Jan. 11, 2011, http://www.acslaw.org/files/Davis%20and%20 
Kalb_Anti-International%20Law.pdf. 
 39.  Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 40.  Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 41.  See Ariane de Vogue, Federal Judge Bars Oklahoma Ballot Initiative on Sharia Law, ABC 
NEWS, Nov. 29, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/federal-judge-bars-implementation-ballot-
initiative-sharia-law/story?id=12269179. 
 42.  See Bill Mears, Judge Issues Permanent Injunction on Oklahoma Sharia Law Ban, CNN 
BELIEF BLOG (Nov. 29, 2010, 4:27 PM), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2010/11/29/judge-issues-
permanent-injunction-on-oklahoma-sharia-law-ban/?iref=allsearch (stating that the Muslim population 
is not “among the larger communities”). 
 43.  Stephen Clark, Group Launches Media Blitz in Oklahoma for Anti-Shariah Ballot Initiative, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/10/20/anti-islamic-group-
launches-media-blitz-oklahoma-anti-shariah-ballot-initiative/; Laurie Ure, Oklahoma Voters Face 
Question on Islamic Law, CNN.COM (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/10/28/ 
oklahoma.sharia.question/ (citing the New Jersey court’s refusal to enter a restraining order against a 
spouse on the basis of his religious beliefs as one of the Oklahoma legislators’ motivations). 
 44.  See S.D. v. M.J.R. 2 A.3d 412, 418-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (reversing trial 
court’s denial of final restraining order on the basis that religiously informed belief diminished criminal 
intent); Richard Edwards, Sharia Courts Operating in Britian, THE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 14, 2008, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2957428/Sharia-law-courts-operating-in-Britain.html (“The 
government has quietly sanctioned that [sharia courts’] rulings are enforceable with the full power of 
the judicial system, through the county courts or High Court. . . . Muslim tribunal courts started passing 
sharia judgments in August 2007. They have dealt with more than 100 cases that range from Muslim 
divorce and inheritance to nuisance neighbours.”). For one relatively succinct description of pluralism 
in Islamic legal thought and the interpretation of sharia, see generally Basim Musallam, The Ordering 
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Yet the amendment’s authors also intended to limit the application of 
international law as well as foreign or religious law. The ballot Oklahoma 
voters received accurately defined international law. The popular reaction 
embodied in State Question 755 mirrors the debate in the academy over a 
relatively narrow set of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions that 
invalidated state statutes using, in part, multilateral human rights treaties 
and arguments consistent with customary international law.45 The reaction 
is also consistent with the current, sometimes heated disagreement between 
scholars who argue that customary international law is coextensive with 
federal common law and those who assert that it is not law at all without 
some form of legislative adoption or incorporation.46 
International law, as legal scholars, diplomatic professionals and state 
legislators define it, is derived from two principal sources: treaties and 
custom.47 While international law scholars and constitutional theorists 
disagree as to the status of customary international law—as federal 
common law, state common law, or neither—they tend to agree on the 
status of treaties in state courts. The Founders, as part of a relatively 
comprehensive displacement of state sovereignty over foreign affairs, 
drafted Article VI of the U.S. Constitution to make ratified treaties supreme 
federal law, binding on state judges.48 Where states threaten treaties 
 
of the Muslim Societies, in THE CAMBRIDGE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD 164 
(Francis Robinson ed., 1996). 
 45.  In Roper v. Simmons, Justice Kennedy did not invoke customary international law per se but 
rather the enlightened practice of civilized states. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“It is proper that we 
acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty. . . . 
The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and 
significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”). 
 46.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (arguing that 
customary international law, without additional administrative or legislative authorization, is not federal 
common law); Harold H. Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) 
(arguing that customary international law is federal common law); Julian G. Ku, Customary 
International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 265 (2001); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and 
Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley & Goldsmith, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International 
Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995).  
 47.  Article 38(1) of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice is generally regarded as 
the authoritative statement as to sources of international law: a. international conventions, whether 
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.  
 48.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that federal authority over foreign affairs existed prior to and beyond the textual limits 
imposed by the U.S. Constitution. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). Curtiss-Wright has never been overruled, 
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through executive, legislative or judicial action, federal judges readily 
invalidate those measures.49 The same scholars who argue that customary 
international law does not have the effect of preemptive federal common 
law generally agree with this view, although some contend that the treaty 
power has been unjustifiably used to limit states’ rights.50 
The authors of Oklahoma State Question 755 intended to limit state 
judges’ use of international law as part of a comprehensive defense against 
a panoply of judicial threats.51 While both scholarly and media sources 
have conflated the underlying rationales for the measure, Rex Duncan, an 
attorney and principal author of the proposed amendment, intended to 
regulate at least three separate sources of judicial authority: Islamic 
religious law, foreign law, and international law. With respect to the 
former, Duncan sought to strip religious law from state judges’ 
consideration, basing his objection on the idea that application of Islamic 
law would undermine certain “Judeo-Christian principles”52 that inform 
state and federal law. With regard to the latter, Duncan aimed to prevent 
Oklahoma judges from using international law to “settle U.S. cases.”53 
The initial draft amendment authorized by the legislature defined 
neither Sharia law nor international law. The state attorney general supplied 
these definitions pursuant to the statutory process by which amendments 
are submitted to Oklahoma voters for approval.54 Oklahoma voters received 
the following definition in connection with the ballot: 
 
but Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer is now regarded as the 
most important precedent as to the extent of federal foreign affairs authority flowing from delegated 
powers under Article I and Article II. See 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952). 
 49.  Wu, supra note 7, at 573 (“There is, perhaps unsurprisingly, a strong historical pattern of 
enforcement of treaties against the individual States of the United States.”). 
 50.  See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 272-73 (2005). 
 51.  Oklahoma Rep Rex Duncan Proposes Law Against Judges Using Sharia Law in State, 
YOUTUBE (June 13, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-LxwPN-2pYw (quoting resolution 
author Rex Duncan, “This is a preemptive strike to make sure that liberal judges don’t take the bench in 
an effort to use their position to undermine those founding principles and to consider international law 
or Sharia Law. The other part of the state question is to prohibit all state courts from considering 
international or Sharia Law when deciding cases, even in cases of first impression.”). 
 52.  Id. Duncan never specified which of the principles he referenced belonged strictly to Judaic or 
Christian traditions and which ones the application of Islamic law might contravene. Because Islam 
inherited both theological and legal principles from Judaism and Christianity, there is significant 
overlap. 
 53. Bill Sherman, Legislator’s Proposal Would Ban Use of Sharia Law, TULSA WORLD, July 18, 
2010, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=14&articleid=20100718_18_A1_ 
Views561266. 
 54.  OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 9(c) (1992); Letter from W.A. Drew Edmondson, Okla. Attorney Gen., 
to M. Susan Savage, Okla. Sec’y of State (June 24, 2010) available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/ 
documents/questions/755.pdf. 
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International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals with the 
conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as 
countries, states and tribes. It deals with their relationship with each 
other. It also deals with some of their relationships with persons. 
The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. 
Sources of international law also include international agreements, as 
well as treaties. 
 
This definition is, in essence, an accessible form of the definition provided 
in the Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States: 
 
International law, as used in this Restatement, consists of rules and 
principles of general application dealing with the conduct of states and of 
international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as 
with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.55 
 
Thus, Oklahomans did not just adopt a prohibition on the application of 
Sharia law; they simultaneously adopted a separate and distinctly defined 
prohibition on international law. 
Ratified treaties, of course, are federal law under the U.S. Constitution 
and binding on state judges: 
 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.56 
 
Strictly read, State Question 755 did not and could not lawfully 
prohibit state judges from applying valid treaties. Instead, it constrained 
state judges’ use of certain non-domestic legal authorities and prohibited 
the use of customary international law to the extent such law does not 
preempt inconsistent state law. The interpretation of treaties often requires 
resort to both customary international law and the use of legal sources like 
a treaty’s negotiating history, or travaux preparatoires.57 For example, the 
 
 55.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101 (1987). 
 56.  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 57.  Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008) (“Because a treaty ratified by the United States 
is ‘an agreement among sovereign powers,’ we have also considered as ‘aids to its interpretation’ the 
negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the U.S. has not ratified, 
is a multilateral treaty both federal and state judges use when interpreting 
treaties.58 To the extent it represents non-binding customary international 
law, State Question 755 has the principal effect of barring its use to 
interpret treaties. 
State Question 755 is in part a response to the U.S. Supreme Court 
exercising its authority to invalidate state laws using multilateral treaties 
and foreign precedent.59 In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the U.S. Supreme 
Court cited the unratified International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights to support its conclusion that the Eighth Amendment barred 
Oklahoma’s execution of sixteen-year-old juveniles.60 In Roper v. 
Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a Missouri statute 
authorizing the death penalty for juveniles younger than eighteen years of 
age based in part on Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, a multilateral human rights treaty the United States has 
not ratified.61 Oklahoma was one of the few states to execute juveniles in 
the period leading up to the decision. In one judgment clarifying the scope 
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the International Court of 
Justice singled out an Oklahoma criminal defendant convicted and 
sentenced to death without being notified that he had the right to contact his 
consulate.62 State Question 755 is, therefore, not curious for its attempt to 
limit the effect of international law, but in the means by which it aimed to 
do so. Oklahoma judges have generally limited the influence of 
international law on criminal adjudications. In the one case where 
Oklahoma state judges relied principally on customary international law to 
provide a rule of decision, they did so to expand Oklahoma’s prosecutorial 
and territorial interests.63 
 
nations.”). 
 58.  Busby v. State, 40 P.3d 807, 814 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (“In other words, both federal and 
state courts have acknowledged and employed the principles of interpretation codified in the Vienna 
Convention.”) (citing both state and federal authorities); Sam Foster Halabi, The World Health 
Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 121, 134 n.55 
(2010) (discussing the dispute as to whether the Vienna Convention is binding U.S. law). 
 59.  Alford, supra note 25. 
 60.  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988). 
 61.  Alford, supra note 25. 
 62.  In re Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 2004 I.C.J. 12 ¶15 (Mar. 
31). See also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 537 n.4 (2008) (noting that, in Avena, the ICJ expressed 
“great concern” that Oklahoma had set the date for Torres’s execution). 
 63.  Hanes v. State, 973 P.2d 330, 333 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998). Because of Oklahoma’s history 
as sovereign territory for certain Native American tribes – which entered into treaties for the disposition 
of land not only with the United States, but with each other – Oklahoma courts regularly confront 
situations in which criminal defendants dispute the jurisdiction of the state for purposes of criminal 
prosecutions. In Hanes v. State, prosecutors in Ottawa County charged Stephen Eugene Hanes, a 
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Depending on certain factors, state legislatures enjoy at least some 
flexibility in regulating state judges’ interpretation of valid treaties under 
the Supremacy Clause. Indeed, some states have passed narrow statutes 
with precisely that aim.64 The more immediate question State Question 755 
poses is: does the conduct of state judges warrant legislative 
circumscription because that conduct threatens state interests? The plain 
text of the Supremacy Clause may be read to authorize state judges to 
undertake at least three inquiries: that laws passed by Congress are “in 
Pursuance” of the Constitution; that treaties are made “under the authority” 
of the United States;65 and that existing state law really stands “contrary” to 
valid federal law, including treaties.66 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 supports this view, allocating to the 
Supreme Court jurisdiction “where is drawn in question the validity of a 
treaty or statute of . . . the United States.”67 Alison LaCroix similarly 
concluded with respect to the Supremacy Clause: 
 
This [constitutional] structure centered on the Supremacy Clause which 
bound state-court judges to follow congressional statutes, treaties and 
even the constitution itself . . . courts and judges would be the mediating 
agents between the national and state governments, ensuring the 
supremacy of the general government in its particular areas of 
competence while minimizing the size of the shadow that national 
 
member of the Cherokee tribe, for fishing protected species of fish in violation of Oklahoma’s 
conservation laws. Hanes argued that, while the bank on which he fished had been conveyed initially to 
the Cherokee Nation and subsequently, through allotment, to the City of Miami, the underlying riverbed 
remained Cherokee Nation territory and therefore beyond Oklahoma’s jurisdiction. Tracing the history 
of U.S. treaties with the Seneca and Shawnee tribes and the Cherokee Nation, the court concluded that 
the Neosho or Grand River formed the boundary between the two nations prior to Oklahoma’s entry 
into the U.S. Because the treaties were silent as to the riverbed, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals resorted to the “well-settled law of international boundaries” to determine that the Cherokee 
Nation had included the riverbed with its allotment, thus abandoning any property claim to it. 
 64.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59d (2011); FLA. STAT. § 901.26 (2011); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7502(c) 
(2005) ; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (2011). 
 65.  In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957), Justice Black attributed the difference between 
laws passed “in Pursuance” of the Constitution and treaties concluded “under the authority” of the 
United States to the need to ensure the survival of treaties made under the Articles of Confederation 
through the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. 
 66.  Prakash, supra note 15, at 1368 (“By requiring state court review of state law, the Supremacy 
Clause implicitly authorizes state courts to review federal legislation as well . . . . Not every federal 
statute is supreme and therefore entitled to trump contrary state law. Rather, the Supremacy Clause only 
requires that federal statutes ‘made in pursuance’ of the Constitution trump contrary state law. Because 
the Supremacy Clause does not mandate preemption every time a federal statute conflicts with a state 
law, state courts presented with such conflicts necessarily must decide when the federal statute will 
trump and when the state law will prevail. In other words . . . state courts engage in judicial review of 
federal legislation.”). 
 67.  Id. at 1369-70. 
HALABI_MACRO_PROOF 11/21/12(DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013 12:10 PM 
2012] THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AS STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARD OF FEDERALISM 79 
oversight cast onto the states.68 
 
The bulk of scholarly effort toward understanding the Supremacy 
Clause has focused on whether and to what extent it empowered state 
judges to review the constitutionality of both federal and state laws. 69 
Scholars have paid less attention to the subtler power of state judges to 
influence treaties and customary international law through their broad 
common law-making authority. While the Founders did not necessarily 
anticipate the changing relationship between treaty-based and customary 
international law, nor the now-regular use of congressional-executive 
agreements to accomplish foreign affairs objectives,70 they did envision a 
process whereby state judges implemented treaties (and, presumably, 
Congressional codifications of the law of nations) against a backdrop of 
existing state constitutional, statutory, and common law.71 
Academic commentators have divided on the extent to which the U.S. 
Constitution authorized states to regulate the content and use of 
international law in their courts. There is little disagreement that the U.S. 
Constitution supplanted some state foreign affairs authority. For example, 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution authorized Congress to regulate 
foreign commerce and to define and punish offenses against the law of 
nations, while Article II provides for a joint treaty-making process between 
the President and the Senate. States are further prohibited from entering 
into any “[a]greement or [c]ompact” with a foreign power or engaging in 
 
 68.  LaCroix, supra note 16, at 171. 
 69.  See, e.g., John Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2052 n.217 (2009) (using the debate between Bradford Clark 
and Peter Strauss on the meaning of Article VI as representative of this debate); Alison L. LaCroix, 
Rhetoric and Reality in Early American Legal History: A Reply to Gordon Wood, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
733, 750 n.70 (2011); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 
1372 (1997); Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How States Control Compliance with 
International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 476-77 (2004). 
 70.  Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Law-
Making in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008); Bradley, supra note 23, at 396 (“During the 
latter part of this century, however, there has been a proliferation of treaties, such that treaty-making has 
now eclipsed custom as the primary mode of international law-making. Moreover, many of these 
treaties take the form of detailed multilateral instruments negotiated and drafted at international 
conferences. These treaties resemble and are designed to operate as international ‘legislation’ binding 
on much of the world.”) (citations omitted). 
 71.  See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. 
L. REV. 1501, 1540 (2006) (“In a few cases, state courts referred to the common law or law of nations 
in interpreting acts of Congress. . . . [T]he principle was that courts should not interpret statutes to be in 
derogation of the common law unless the statute derogated from it by express language.”). NAFTA, for 
example, is not a treaty but was enacted through a congressional-executive agreement. The process by 
which its relationship with existing federal and state law is clarified is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3312 
(2006). 
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war without Congressional consent.72 
Yet these relatively straightforward propositions conceal numerous 
ambiguities as to the distribution of state and federal authority according to 
the Framers’ original design. For example, not all treaties are created equal. 
Some treaties are self-executing; they impart judicially enforceable rights 
without additional implementing legislation from Congress.73 Courts 
interpret these treaties with similar, although not perfectly coextensive 
canons that they use to interpret statutes.74 Other treaties are non-self-
executing; they do not convey judiciable rights unless Congress 
incorporates treaty provisions into domestic law.75 The effect of the latter 
type of treaty on state law is disputed.76 
 
 72.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The U.S. Supreme Court has gone farther than these enumerated 
powers by asserting that certain “powers inherent in sovereignty” obtain outside the Constitution’s text. 
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936); see also Duncan B. Hollis, 
Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 770-72 (2010) (noting interpretive disputes over 
compact clause). 
 73.  Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (“The rule of equality established by [the 
treaty] cannot be rendered nugatory in any part of the United States by municipal ordinances or state 
laws. It stands on the same footing of supremacy as do the provisions of the Constitution and laws of 
the United States. It operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be 
applied and given authoritative effect by the courts.”); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and 
Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 656 (2000) (“Courts vary to some extent in the precise test they 
use to determine whether a treaty is self-executing. Typically, courts consider a variety of factors, such 
as the treaty’s language and purpose, the nature of the obligations that it imposes, and the domestic 
consequences associated with immediate judicial enforcement.”). 
 74.  See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 537 (2011) (“When we interpret treaties, we 
consider the interpretations of the courts of other nations, and we should do the same when Congress 
asks us to interpret a statute in light of a treaty's language.”); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 
(2008) (“Because a treaty ratified by the United States is ‘an agreement among sovereign powers,’ we 
have also considered as ‘aids to its interpretation’ the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as 
well as ‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory nations.”); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 
396-397 (1985) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its 
text.”); Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“But when the terms of the stipulation 
import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses 
itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it 
can become a rule for the Court.”); Michael P. van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. 
L. REV. 687 (1998) (objecting to federal courts’ adoption of traditional statutory rules of construction to 
interpret treaties); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6. U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[C]ourts 
interpret statutes in light of the law of nations.”).  
 75.  Medellin, 552 U.S. at 525-26 (“[T]he responsibility for transforming an international 
obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.”) See Wu, supra 
note 7, at 607 (tracing the history of non-self-executing treaties in U.S. jurisprudence to Camp v. 
Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 393 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1788). 
 76.  Compare Vazquez, supra note 5, at 2207 (“A self-executing treaty is a treaty that preempts 
inconsistent state law without the need for action by the federal legislature, and a non-self-executing 
treaty is one that does not preempt state law without such action.”), and Michael P. Van Alstine, The 
Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1893-94 
(2005) (arguing that non-self-executing treaties do not preempt conflicting state law whereas self-
executing treates are preemptive federal law), with Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding “Fraudulent” Executive 
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While questions of treaty interpretation pervade litigation in both 
federal and state courts, academic commentators most fiercely contest the 
definition and status, if any, of customary international law. Customary 
international law, which is generally defined as a rule manifested in 
widespread state practice conducted out of a sense of legal obligation, has 
drawn significant attention in recent years, largely due to litigation in 
federal courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act.77 In many of these cases, 
violations of human rights are asserted to be a violation of customary 
international law, which, the argument goes, enjoys status as federal 
common law.78 
The extent to which customary international law really is federal 
law—or for that matter, state law—is unclear.79 When the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins reinforced federal 
courts’ limited common law making authority under the U.S. Constitution, 
a number of questions persisted. One of these questions asked to what 
extent the nineteenth century’s regime of general common law—along with 
its international content—remained good state law, applicable by federal 
district courts sitting in diversity.80 The conventional view, which Jack 
 
Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1257 n.85 (1993) (arguing that in the context of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, “even a non-self-executing treaty preempts inconsistent state law”). 
 77.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
102(2) (1987) (defining customary international law as a general and consistent practice of nations 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation); Anthony A. D'Amato, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 76-87 (1971).  
 78.  See Sosa v. Alvarez Machain 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Bradley, supra note 63, at 680 (2000); 
Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal 
Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 472-73 (1997) (citing Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. 398 (1964)); Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of 
International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 295 (1994).  
 79.  Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (summarizing the debate between “modernists” who argue that customary 
international law is preemptive federal common law and “revisionists” who argue it is not); Phillips, 
supra note 20, at 562 (noting cases in which federal courts have granted removal from state court based 
on a theory of customary international law-as-federal common law); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the 
Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 369-70 (2001-02) (arguing that 
customary international law comprised “general law” which provided rules of decisions under fairly 
narrow circumstances). 
 80.  See Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276, 282 n.17(C) (Okla. 1990) 
(discussing whether state court respect for foreign judgments originated as an inherited customary 
principle from English common law); Bellia & Clark, supra note 68, at 47 (“Prior to ratification, states 
adopted the common law of England, which incorporated the law of nations. After ratification, state 
courts continued to apply the law of nations as part of their municipal common law, including the 
common law of crimes”) (citing Connecticut, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania state cases relying on the 
law of nations); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law 
after Erie 66 FORDHAM L. REV., 393, 393-94 (1997). 
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Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley traced to an early essay by Phillip Jessup 
analyzing the effect of Erie on international law, was that customary 
international law was part of federal common law. The revisionist view, for 
which Goldsmith and Bradley are generally credited, asserts that customary 
international law is not federal law unless authorized as such by Congress 
and may be part of the common law of the states to the extent that 
individual states incorporate it.81 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not clarified the issue. Certain decisions 
strongly suggest that well-defined customary international law is federal 
common law. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,82 the U.S. Supreme 
Court applied the “act of state” doctrine—a rule that, with some exceptions, 
“precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the 
public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own 
territory”—to respect Cuba’s decision to nationalize its sugar industry.83 
The Court wrote that the act of state doctrine represented “a basic choice 
regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National 
Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the 
international community [which] must be treated exclusively as an aspect 
of federal law.”84 While the Court noted that not all customary international 
law is enforceable in federal or state courts, the case has generally stood for 
the proposition that customary international law has the effect of 
preemptive federal law.85 
On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence has suggested that even the federal 
government’s domain over “international law-making” powers should be 
strictly construed against the background of state sovereignty prevailing at 
the time of the ratification.86 In Alden v. Maine, the Supreme Court decided 
 
 81.  Ku, supra note 38, at 266-67; see also Bradley, supra note 63, at 671-72 (arguing that the 
case for federal common law making is stronger for treaties than for customary international law). 
 82.  376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). 
 83.  Bellia and Clark, supra note 68, at 9 (“The [Sabbatino] decision is best read, however, to 
reflect adherence to the same allocation of powers principles recognized by the Marshall Court, under 
which the Court upheld the perfect rights of sovereigns as a means of preserving federal political branch 
authority over foreign relations . . . Taken in historical context, the best reading of Supreme Court 
precedent dating from the founding to the present is that the law of nations does not apply as 
preemptive federal law by virtue of any Article III power to fashion federal common law, but only 
when necessary to preserve and implement distinct Article I and Article II powers . . .”.). 
 84.  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425. 
 85.  Carlos M. Vazquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist 
and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 
1539-41 (2011) (discussing the relevance of Sabbatino for the customary international law-as-federal 
common law debate). 
 86.  See Lee, supra note 1, at 1028 (“[T]he founding generation was not only familiar with 
contemporary international law but also frequently consulted it in matters of statecraft. It is 
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that the states had relinquished none of their sovereignty “except as altered 
by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments,” 
primarily the Fourteenth Amendment.87 If the Constitution abrogated state 
sovereign immunity only to that extent, then the enumerated powers given 
to Congress and the President in the foreign sphere should be no less 
strictly construed than those given in the domestic sphere, or at least, no 
less strictly construed than necessary to give the United States the 
minimum rights a sovereign enjoyed under international law as it existed in 
1789.88 While many scholars have explored the implications of 
constitutional structure, text and history for federalism, few have studied 
what states, particularly state judges, are actually doing with treaties or 
customary international law.89 
All sides concur that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court is likely 
to provide any predictable or sustainable resolution to the proper 
distribution of state and federal sovereignty. To the extent that the “plan of 
the Convention” left some sovereign authority over foreign affairs to the 
states, state executives, legislatures, and judges may appropriately make 
 
unsurprising, then, that the Founders would turn to the settled law of nations for guidance in deciding 
the domestic law issue of who has standing to sue a State in inter-state and international suits brought in 
federal court.”). 
 87.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 756 (1999). 
 88.  Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 
42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513, 536 (2002); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: the 
Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 369-90 (1999) 
(arguing that the original understanding did not impart unrestricted federal authority over foreign 
affairs); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 
1618 (1997) (same); Bellia, Jr. and Clark, supra, note 74, at 5 (“Specifically, the Court has respected 
foreign sovereigns’ “perfect rights” (and close analogues) as a means of ensuring that any decision to 
commit the nation to war would rest exclusively with the political branches, and not with the judiciary 
or the states . . . To serve that end, Article III authorized federal jurisdiction over categories of cases – 
such as those involving admiralty and ambassadors – in which the law of nations would often supply 
rules of decision.”).  
 89.  Janet Koven Levit, A Tale of International Law in the Heartland: Torres and the Role of State 
Courts in Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 163, 183-84 (2004) (“In 
part, scholars and practitioners’ neglect of state courts may be a product of some intellectual myopia. 
The giants of international law typically reside in the political or economic power centers, often 
affiliated with the nation’s most prestigious law schools, where the Supreme Court and federal appellate 
decisions dominate almost all casebooks, and where students learn that the most prestigious post-law-
school jobs are federal court clerkships . . . State courts thereby recede in the analysis, often out of 
benign neglect.”); Anna M. Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: a Policy Analysis of Litigating 
International Human Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 139, 179 (2006) (“State 
courts are often overlooked despite the important role they play in the creation of substantive policies 
that affect American citizens on an individual and local level . . . . In the U.S., the bulk of the judicial 
workload – over 99 percent – occurs at the state rather than federal level, with 95 percent of U.S. judges 
working at the state level.”). But see Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How States 
Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2004); Julian G. Ku, Customary 
International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 265 (2001). 
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and apply law in that domain. Therefore, state judges retain wide discretion 
over the application of customary international law to disputes before them 
and circumscribed, though still influential, discretion in interpreting 
treaties. It is the use of this authority which State Question 755 and similar 
measures aim to regulate. 
Whatever the motivations of Oklahoma legislators in attempting to 
impose a blanket prohibition on state judges’ consideration of international 
law in disputes before them, Oklahomans and Oklahoma businesses 
confront a range of issues—idiosyncratic and common—that require 
regular interaction with international law. Oklahoma entered the United 
States as a combination of the Oklahoma Territory and the Indian Territory 
which early on caused its courts to grapple with questions of treaty 
interpretation.90 Oklahoma is also a major producer of crude oil and natural 
gas; extraction, transportation, and refining of these fuels are frequently 
governed by contracts specifying application of international law. 
Oklahoma businesses regularly seek advice from personnel at Tulsa’s 
international sea port, the Port of Catoosa, on potential legal issues related 
to carriage of goods by sea governed by both treaty91 and customary 
international law.92 Like other states, Oklahoma courts struggle with the 
appropriate remedies for alien criminal defendants who are not notified of 
their right to seek consular assistance upon arrest. Oklahoma judges have 
used international law to promote executive and legislative objectives in 
these and other areas. 
 
 90.  Simmons v. Whittington, 112 P. 1018, 1019 (Okla. 1910) (interpreting treaty with the 
Chickasaw and Choctaw Tribes); Woodward v. De Graffenried, 131 P. 162, 163-64 (Okla. 1912) 
(interpreting the Creek Treaty of 1901); Marcy v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 45 Okla. 1 (1914) (interpreting a 
U.S. treaty with the Seminole Nation). Many of these treaties continue to govern U.S. and state relations 
with Native American tribes. See generally Judith Royster The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1 
(1995). 
 91.  See Granite State Ins. Co. v. M/V Caraibe, 825 F. Supp. 1113, 1123 (D.P.R. 1993).  
 92.  The Tulsa Port of Catoosa, which includes a range of industries with 63 facilities and 
approximately 4,000 employees are located at the port shipped 2,266,893 tons of cargo in 2010. Tulsa 
Port of Catoosa, PORT CENTRAL, Winter 2011, available at 
http://www.tulsaport.com/PDFs/PortCentral_2.2011_v.pdf. See Joshua Tietsort, Oklahoma State 
Question 755: Possible Implications (paper on file with author) (citing Interview with Richard 
Grenville, Director of Logistics and Business Development, Tulsa Port of Catoosa in Tulsa, Okla. 
(March 10, 2011)).  As part of this advice, Grenville will supply sellers a standard bill of lading which 
incorporates the Hague Rules or the "International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of 
Law relating to Bills of Lading" codified in the United States as the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act at 46 
U.S.C. § 30701 et seq. (2011). See State Establishment for Agr. Product Trading v. M/V Wesermunde, 
838 F.2d 1576, 1580 (11th Cir. 1988) for a background of the Hague Rules; see also Spartus Corp. v. 
S/S Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310, 1315 (5th Cir. 1979); 46 U.S.C. § 30702 (2011). 
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II. CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Since 1893, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has 
served as a forum for the harmonization and unification of choice-of-law 
rules across a wide range of private law transactions including cross-border 
evidence gathering, family law, certification of foreign public documents, 
laws applicable to the estates of deceased persons, and service of process.93 
The United States has ratified a small number of treaties drafted under the 
auspices of the Hague Conference including the Hague Convention on 
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters (Hague Service Convention), the Hague Convention 
on Taking Evidence Abroad (Hague Evidence Convention), the Convention 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption and the Hague Convention on the Legalization of 
Foreign Public Documents.94 State judges have extensive experience 
applying many of these treaties like the Hague Service Convention and the 
Hague Evidence Convention. 
A. Hague Service Convention 
The Hague Service Convention aimed to resolve certain disruptions in 
transnational litigation caused by differing approaches to service of 
process. In civil law jurisdictions, for example, service of process is often a 
function of the state, not of a private party. Unfamiliar litigants, often from 
common law states, found themselves facing default judgments in civil law 
jurisdictions because a party had served documents to a local official but 
the official never forwarded the documents to the opposing party.95 For 
their part, civil law states shared common law states’ desire for a uniform, 
centralized system of process for each state.96 The Hague Service 
Convention explicitly proposed to “create appropriate means to ensure that 
judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to 
the notice of the addressee in sufficient time” and facilitate mutual judicial 
cooperation across borders.97 The Hague Service Convention accomplished 
 
 93.  HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
 94.  See, e.g., Estate of Tassaras v. Michas, 404 Ill. App. 3d 825 (2010). 
 95.  Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk 486 U.S. 694, 703 (1988) (noting that an 
explicit reason for the convention was elimination of this civil law requirement known as notification 
au parquet).  
 96.  Emily F. Johnson, Note, Privatizing the Duties of the Central Authority, 37 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L. L. REV. 769, 771 (2005) (detailing conflicting interests leading to the Hague Service 
Convention). 
 97.  Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters, preamble, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 
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these objectives by requiring each state to designate a central authority 
charged with receiving requests—using standardized forms—for service 
from a judicial officer from another contracting state and, in turn, arranging 
for service upon the party in the receiving state often through a local 
court.98 For example, the United States’ “central authority” used to be 
housed in a specialized office in the U.S. State Department, although that 
function has since been privatized.99 Once effected, the central authority 
sends a certificate of service to the judicial officer who sent the request. 
The Hague Service Convention allows a receiving state to authorize 
alternative methods of service, like mail or private process servers, 
although this election requires a separate designation in the documents 
contracting parties file with their accession or ratification.100 The United 
States joined the treaty in 1967. 
The Hague Service Convention is officially incorporated into Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(1).101 Many states have incorporated the treaty 
through statute,102 judicial doctrine,103 or amendment to state rules of civil 
procedure.104 State judges regularly apply the treaty.105 While no Oklahoma 
court has yet adjudicated a dispute over service made under the treaty, 
Oklahoma judges have interpreted the state long-arm statute to “extend 
jurisdiction of the Oklahoma courts to the outer limits permitted by the . . . 
 
(entered into force for the United States on February 10, 1969) [hereinafter Hague Service Convention].  
 98.  Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 486 U.S. at 698 (1988). 
 99.  Hague Service Convention, http://www.hagueservice.net/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
 100.  See Hague Service Convention, supra note 86, art. 10 (“Provided the State of destination does 
not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with:  
a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons 
abroad,  
b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of 
origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, 
officials or other competent persons of the State of destination,  
c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service of 
judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent 
persons of the State of destination.”). 
 101.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1) (expressly authorizing the means of service designated by the 
Hague Convention).  
 102.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59d (2011). 
 103.  See, e.g., Selco, S.R.L. v. Webb, 727 So. 2d 796, 799 (Ala. 1998) (“Service of process on 
corporations of foreign countries that are members of the Hague Convention, such as Selco, must be 
perfected according to the terms of the Hague Convention Treaty.”).  
 104.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 413.10 (Deering 2012). 
 105. See, e.g., Selco, 727 So. 2d at 800 (invalidating default judgment against Italian company for 
failure to effect service under the terms of the Hague Service Convention); Parsons v. Bank Leumi Le-
Israel, B.M., 565 So. 2d 20, 25 (Ala. 1990) (determining that Alabama defendant was properly served 
by Israeli plaintiff under Hague Convention); Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 770 (Ala. 1983) 
(threatening effective sanction for foreign official’s failure to play by the rules). 
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United States Constitution.”106 It is in the context of giving effect to state 
long-arm statutes that state judges have shaped the applicability of the 
treaty. 
In two key areas, state judges have exercised significant influence on 
the treaty’s scope: 1) the conditions under which the treaty applies, and 2) 
whether the treaty permits service through means other than the central 
authority designated by the treaty text. In Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk,107 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted Illinois’ 
state judges’ determination that a domestic subsidiary may serve as an 
agent for service of process on a foreign corporation, even where that 
agency is involuntary and the determination is made under state law.108 
State judges have also limited the constraints of the treaty through their 
influence on using alternative means of service under Article 10(a). 
1. State Judicial Limitation of the Treaty’s Scope 
When Herwig Schlunk’s parents were killed in an automobile accident 
in Cook County, Illinois, he brought a defective design suit in Illinois state 
court against the distributor of the vehicle, Volkswagen of America, Inc. 
Volkswagen of America first denied that it designed the automobile and 
second argued that it was not an agent for the actual manufacturer, its 
German parent corporation, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (“VW”).109 
Schlunk amended his complaint to include VW as a party, but VW entered 
a limited appearance for purposes of quashing service, asserting that it 
could only be served pursuant to the Hague Service Convention.110 Despite 
the language in Article 1 of the Service Convention requiring that the treaty 
apply “in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion 
to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad,” the 
Illinois trial judge determined that Volkswagen of America was VW’s 
agent for service of process as a matter of Illinois law: 
 
VWoA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of VWAG, a majority of the 
members of the board of directors of VWoA are members of the board of 
management of VWAG, and VWoA is the exclusive importer and 
distributor of VWAG products sold in the United States pursuant to a 
manufacturer-importer agreement entered into between VWAG and 
VWoA . . . VWoA and VWAG are so closely related that VWoA is an 
agent for service of process as a matter of law, notwithstanding VWAG’s 
 
 106.  Winston Indus., Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 560 P.2d 572, 574 (Okla. 1977). 
 107.  486 U.S. 694, 709-08 (1988). 
 108.  Id. at 709-08. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  112 Ill. 2d 595 (1986). 
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failure or refusal to have made such a formal appointment of VWoA as 
its agent. The . . . plaintiff’s service of process [is] effective under the 
Supreme Court rules and Illinois code, and [is] not in conflict with “The 
Convention On the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters” (Hague Convention), 
which . . . applie[s] only to service of process outside the United 
States.111 
 
The Illinois appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling noting that 
“[i]f the supremacy clause permits service on agents within the forum 
State, despite the existence of the Hague Convention (which says nothing 
about locally appointed agents), it should not matter how that agency 
relationship came about.”112 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected VW’s 
appeal.113 VW then sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court.114 
While the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision undertook an extensive 
analysis of the treaty’s text and negotiating history focusing on the meaning 
of “service” within the Convention, the effect of the decision was to adopt 
the state trial court’s decision that the treaty did not apply. Justice 
O’Connor concluded: “Where service on a domestic agent is valid and 
complete under both state law and the Due Process Clause, our inquiry 
ends and the Convention has no further implications.” 115 The decision 
effectively validated Illinois’ decision that it could narrow the Hague 
Service Convention’s applicability, facilitating product liability suits like 
Schlunk’s in Illinois courts.116 
 
 111.  Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 503 N.E.2d 1045, 1046 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
 112.  Id. at 1048. 
 113.  Id. at 1046.  
 114.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari because some state supreme courts had determined 
that the Hague Service Convention provided exclusive means of service, although, as the Illinois 
appellate court noted, none of these cases involved a state judicial determination that a theory of 
involuntary agency rendered the treaty inapplicable. The federal Supreme Court framed the issue as 
whether “an attempt to serve process on a foreign corporation by serving its domestic subsidiary which, 
under state law, is the foreign corporation's involuntary agent for service of process” was “compatible 
with the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (Hague Service Convention).” Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk 486 U.S. 694, 696-98 (1988). For the Illinois appellate court’s discussion 
of these cases, see Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 503 N.E.2d at 1047-49. 
 115.  Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 707. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan noted the 
problem that adopting the Illinois state courts’ decision posed for the national interest under the treaty. 
He found “it implausible that the Convention's framers intended to leave each contracting nation, and 
each of the 50 States within our Nation, free to decide for itself under what circumstances, if any, the 
Convention would control.” Id. at 708. 
 116.  See also Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880 (Ala. 
1983) (authorizing service under an alter ego theory of corporate unity to avoid Hague Convention 
requirements). 
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2. State Judicial Expansion of Alternative Means of Service to 
Facilitate Access to State Courts 
State judges have also influenced the unsettled question as to whether 
the Hague Service Convention authorizes parties to send service via 
international registered mail instead of through the designated central 
authority. Article 10(a) of the treaty reads: 
 
Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention 
shall not interfere with—a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by 
postal channels, directly to persons abroad . . . .117 
 
Article 10(a) uses the word “send” instead of “serve” leading some 
defendants to argue that the provision referred to judicial documents issued 
subsequent to formal service of process, which must be accomplished 
through designated “central authorities.” In one of the earliest cases 
implicating the treaty, a state trial judge in California determined that 
Article 10(a) permitted a plaintiff in a product liability suit to serve a 
defendant through international registered mail.118 The California appellate 
court affirmed, reasoning that: 
 
The reference to ‘the freedom to send judicial documents by postal 
channels, directly to persons abroad’ would be superfluous unless it was 
related to the sending of such documents for the purpose of service. The 
mails are open to all. Moreover, the reference appears in the context of 
other alternatives to the use of the ‘Central Authority’ created by the 
treaty. If it be assumed that the purpose of the convention is to establish 
one method to avoid the difficulties and controversy attendant to the use 
of other methods, it does not necessarily follow that other methods may 
not be used if effective proof of delivery can be made.119 
 
The U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted that court’s reasoning 
when deciding that the Hague Service Convention authorized service of 
process by mail: 
 
The service of process by registered mail did not violate the Hague 
Convention. Plaintiffs declined to follow the service route allowed under 
Article 5 of the Convention, which permits service via a “Central 
Authority” of the country in which service is to be made. Instead, 
 
 117.  Hague Service Convention, supra note 86, art. 10. 
 118.  Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App.3d 808, 821 (Ct. App. 1973). 
 119.  Id. (citations omitted). (“Although there is some merit to the proposed distinction it is 
outweighed by consideration of the entire scope of the convention. It purports to deal with the subject of 
service abroad of judicial documents.”).  
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plaintiffs chose to follow the equally acceptable route allowed under 
Articles 8 and 10. See Shoei Kako v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App.3d 808, 
109 Cal.Rptr. 402 (1973).120 
 
Indeed, California state jurisprudence interpreting the treaty is as or 
more developed than federal jurisprudence insofar as breadth of authorities 
consulted and clarity of analysis are concerned. In Denlinger v. 
Chinadotcom Corp., a Silicon Valley-based California resident worked for 
a Hong-Kong based employer.121 After his employer fired him, Denlinger 
brought an action for wrongful termination in California court and served 
his former employer through registered mail. The employer asserted that 
service was defective because the plaintiff had not served it through its 
central authority. The California appellate court looked to language in the 
Convention, interpretation from both state and federal authorities, 
declarations other contracting parties issued in connection with ratification, 
an opinion from the U.S. State Department, as well as guidance from the 
treaty’s governing body. The court concluded that both “the text and 
context of the Convention demonstrate that the Convention is meant to 
apply only to service of process, and that fact undermines respondents’ 
claim that Article 10(a) is meant to cover the mailing of nonservice of 
process judicial documents only.”122 While the broader effect of the ruling 
was to again interpret Article 10(a) as permitting service by mail, the more 
immediate effect was to facilitate access to California courts, in that 
particular case, in an action by a California resident against a foreign 
employer.123 
In the context of the Hague Service Convention, not only have state 
 
 120.  Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1986). State judges, of course, struggle 
with difficult matters of interpretation just as federal judges do. The split between the Second Circuit 
and the Eighth Circuit on the Hague Service Convention Article 10(a) issue is traceable to the split 
between two California appellate court decisions. In Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the California appeals court decision in Suzuki Motor 
Co. v. Superior Court. 889 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1989). In Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court, the 
court found that because service of process by registered mail was not permitted under Japanese law, it 
was “extremely unlikely” that Japan's failure to object to Article 10(a) was intended to authorize the use 
of registered mail as an effective mode of service of process, particularly in light of the fact that Japan 
had specifically objected to the much more formal modes of service by Japanese officials which were 
available in Article 10(b) and (c). 249 Cal.Rptr. 376, 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 121.  110 Cal. App. 4th 1396 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 122.  Id. at 1401.  
 123.  See Sbarro, Inc. v. Tukdan Holdings, Ltd., 921 N.Y.S.2d 873, 839 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)  
(“Moreover, a Special Commission of the Hague Convention that met in 2003 considered the issue and 
concluded that the term ‘send’ in article 10 (a) is to be understood as meaning ‘service’ through postal 
channels.”); Cantara v. Peeler, 701 N.Y.S.2d 556 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (permitting service by mail on 
three Canadian criminal defendants).  
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judges’ interpretations loosened constraints imposed by the treaty 
(Schlunk), expanded access to state courts through alternative means of 
effecting service (Shoei Kako) and generally influenced federal 
jurisprudence, state judges have also used their rules of civil procedure to 
influence the treaty’s scope and effect. New York courts, for example, have 
determined that parties may waive the applicability of the Hague Service 
Convention through contract and serve parties via email under certain 
circumstances.124 In Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, a North Carolina appellate 
court determined that strict compliance with the treaty was excusable 
where an “arbitrary refusal of service” was shown.125 In Broad v. 
Mannesmann, the Washington Supreme Court determined that use of the 
Convention tolled the statutory service period, thus allowing a product 
liability suit by two Washington residents against a German corporation to 
proceed.126 The net effect of these and other decisions is to preserve and 
facilitate citizens’ access to state courts, even if that access is, on occasion, 
used by foreign plaintiffs against defendant state citizens.127 
B. Hague Evidence Convention 
As with the Hague Service Convention, the drafters of the Hague 
Evidence Convention intended to harmonize and substantiate the various 
diplomatic protocols and informal processes that characterized 
transnational civil and commercial discovery prior to its adoption.128 Hague 
Conference participants developed the Evidence Convention to minimize 
the difficulties courts and lawyers faced when attempting to obtain 
evidence from countries with “markedly different legal systems.”129 
Generally a compromise between civil law jurisdictions in which judges 
actively managed discovery and common law jurisdictions which entitled 
parties’ attorneys to drive the evidence-gathering process, the Hague 
Evidence Convention established procedures for judicial communication 
over the taking of evidence in the jurisdiction of another signatory state.130 
 
 124.  See e.g., Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L., 910 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421-
22 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)  (“[W]e see no reason why the requirements of the [Hague] Convention may 
not be waived by contract.”). 
 125.  477 S.E.2d 239, 263 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). 
 126.  10 P.3d 371 (Wash. 2000). 
 127.  See, e.g., Parsons v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M., 565 So. 2d 20 (Ala. 2000) (affirming 
foreign court judgment against Alabama citizen). 
 128.  Hague Service Convention, supra note 86; see also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. 
Superior Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
 129.  Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, (1987) 482 U.S. 522, 531 
(1987) (citing S. Exec. Doc. No. A, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., at VI (1972)). 
 130.  See e.g., id. at 534-35 (describing the purposes of the treaty). 
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1. State Judicial Circumscription of the Treaty: the First Resort Rule 
State judges, who faced the earliest disputes implicating the treaty, 
decisively determined that it did not provide the exclusive means of 
evidence-gathering in civil litigation involving a foreign national from a 
signatory country.131 Instead, state judges fashioned an interpretive 
alternative which ultimately shaped the U.S. Supreme Court’s resolution of 
the Evidence Convention’s mandatory scope. As an issue of first 
impression in California state courts, judges determined that parties seeking 
discovery of evidence located in a foreign jurisdiction must first attempt to 
obtain that evidence through Hague Convention channels. However, should 
the treaty create unreasonable hurdles to discovery, state judges could 
impose appropriate remedies under state rules of discovery.132 This “first 
resort” rule represented state judges’ efforts to give relatively limited effect 
to a treaty acknowledged to be federal law. According to these early 
decisions, the Hague Evidence Convention merely codified general 
principles of judicial comity which had long faced judges presiding over 
litigants from foreign jurisdictions and did not deprive them of their 
ultimate ability to order discovery.133 
From the first disputes in federal court involving the treaty, federal 
judges determined that the treaty offered only recommendations intended to 
facilitate transnational judicial comity as opposed to binding constraints on 
evidence-gathering. After federal judges interpreted the treaty as entirely 
permissive, consistently referring to California state jurisprudence on the 
matter, state judges began to eliminate their “first resort” requirements or 
 
 131.  See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219, 221-22 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1973) (“Whatever the generous provisions of the California discovery statutes, courts ordering 
discovery abroad must conform to the channels and procedures established by the host nation . . . 
[however s]hould a foreign-based litigant such as VWAG hide behind diplomatic walls, the California 
courts may deal with that situation when it appears.”); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior 
Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 885(Ct. App. 1981) (“Once again we stress that we do not question the 
jurisdiction of the trial court to order VWAG, as a party to the lawsuit before it, to give discovery in 
West Germany. With the qualifications we have stated under California law, the orders are appropriate 
to the action and VWAG is legitimately subject to the orders. We conclude only that the trial court, in 
the exercise of judicial restraint based on international comity, should have declined to proceed other 
than under the Hague Convention at this stage.”); Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc, 
S.A., No. 6525, 1981 Del. Ch. LEXIS 501, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 1981) (“I have some difficulty in 
believing that the Hague Convention was meant to provide the exclusive avenue of relief in this type of 
situation . . . Under the laws of this State Morton-Norwich is entitled to the pre-trial production of 
relevant documents for the purpose of framing the issues for trial.”). 
 132.  See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22.  
 133.  See id. See also Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (Ct. App. 
1985) (“[The] Hague Evidence Convention does not affect the discovery of information in the United 
States and that, with respect to information available only in foreign countries, its application is 
discretionary.”). 
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determine, on first impression, that the treaty offered only limited 
protections to foreign defendants.134 Indeed, in its most authoritative 
pronouncement on the Hague Evidence Convention, the U.S. Supreme 
Court by a 5-4 majority rendered the treaty “optional” subject to a case-by-
case comity analysis.135 Relying on precedent from California, New Jersey, 
Texas, and West Virginia state courts, Justice Blackmun’s dissent 
advocated the “first resort” approach initially articulated by state judges.136 
It might be argued that, in the interest of federalism, state judges 
should have pioneered the “strongly optional” interpretive alternative. 
However, as one federal district court concluded, acknowledging the 
contributions of California state judges, “[t]he [state] cases may be further 
reconciled by the possibility that California courts felt more obliged to 
yield to the supremacy of a federal treaty over state laws, whereas the 
[Pennsylvania federal district court] was confronted as we are with the 
federal rules and a federal treaty on essentially equal footing.”137 Stated 
differently, state judges assumed that the treaty had at least some effect as 
federal law. Within that limitation, their contributions make more sense: 
emphasizing the treaty’s non-exclusiveness for purposes of obtaining 
discovery abroad and conditioning application of the treaty on its 
functionality.138 
2. Using the Hague Evidence Treaty to Give Effect to Plaintiffs’ 
Choice of State Forum 
While the evidence is somewhat mixed,139 state judges have also 
 
 134.  See, e.g., Sandsend Fin. Consultants, Ltd. v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. App. 1988) 
(“We accordingly hold that the Hague Evidence Convention is a permissive supplement to the Texas 
Rules of Civil Procedure. As a permissive supplement, it is within the trial court's discretion to 
determine whether the Hague Convention procedures should be used as a first resort.”); Am. Home 
Assurance Co. v. Societe Commerciale Toutelectric, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 430, 433 (Ct. App. 2002) (“We 
hold that the rule of first resort to the Hague Convention announced in Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 858 [176 Cal. Rptr. 874] 
(Volkswagenwerk) has been superseded by the balancing test provided in Aerospatiale.”); Volkswagen 
of Am. v. Otto Durr Beteiligungs GmbH, 37 Pa. D. & C.3d 165, 170 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1984) (“These 
documents contain no statements which suggest in any way that the Convention was intended to 
supplant the liberal discovery procedures of our courts when the assistance of a foreign court is not 
sought.”). 
 135.  Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 533 (1987). 
 136.  Id. at 540 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).  
 137.  Murphy v. Rex-Trusion Systems, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 360, 363 (D. Vt. 1984). 
 138.  See e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 539-40. 
 139.  A Lexis search using the key words “‘Hague’ /10 ‘evidence’” and ‘forum non conveniens’” 
yielded 94 federal appellate and district court cases. Of those, 49 orders granted motions to dismiss 
based in part on the difficulties or complexities of using Hague Convention processes, 17 orders denied 
motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens because of the access the Hague Convention 
provided while the remaining 28 cases mentioned the Hague Convention in passing or did not consider 
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appeared to use the Hague Evidence Convention as a shield against 
attempts to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds while federal judges 
have generally used the treaty as a reason to grant, not deny, forum non 
conveniens motions.140 In other words, a trial court considering whether or 
not to dismiss an action because an alternative forum exists may give 
preference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum because the Hague Evidence 
Convention provides means to obtain evidence abroad; or a trial court may 
use the Hague Evidence Convention as a means to reject plaintiff’s choice 
of forum because the treaty’s processes are slow and expensive. State 
judges have tended toward the former while federal judges have tended 
toward the latter. An appellate court in Arizona, for example, specifically 
required a trial court to weigh the availability of the Hague Evidence 
Convention when determining whether to dismiss on the basis of forum non 
conveniens so as to respect plaintiff’s choice of forum.141 Delaware judges 
have been resolute in allowing plaintiffs to use the availability of Hague 
Evidence Convention procedures to overcome the “overwhelming 
hardship” movants for forum non conveniens dismissal must show to be 
 
motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. See, e.g., Clerides v. Boeing Co., 534 F.3d 623, 
629-30 (7th Cir. 2008) (dismissing the case rather than require parties to use the Hague Convention to 
obtain the testimony of a large number of non-party witnesses through letters rogatory). But see, e.g., 
Crosstown Songs U.K. Ltd. v. Spirit Music Grp., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 13, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("If this 
suit is not dismissed, [Defendant] will have to engage in the time-consuming and expensive process of 
obtaining essential documentary evidence and witness testimony under the Hague Convention."); 
Turedi v. Coca Cola Co., 460 F. Supp. 2d 507, 526-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Even if some testimony of 
non-parties could be obtained . . . under the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in 
Civil or Commercial Matters . . . [the] circumstances would cause not only financial hardships, but 
significant delays in preparing the case for trial.”); Melgares v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 
231, 244 n.8 (D. Conn. 2009) (describing obtaining testimony of Spanish witnesses through letters 
rogatory as “a difficult and time-consuming—if not altogether futile—endeavor”); Da Rocha v. Bell 
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (describing letters rogatory as 
“notoriously inefficient”); Kultur Int'l Films v. Covent Garden Pioneer, FSP., 860 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 
1994); contra Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting Hague 
Convention as a reason to reverse district court’s grant of motion to dismiss). 
 140.  Using the same search, supra note 124, out of 23 state cases, state judges denied motions to 
dismiss for forum non conveniens on 13 occasions and granted three, while the remaining seven did not 
implicate the Hague Evidence Convention or considered discovery motions instead of motions to 
dismiss. See, e.g., Warburg, Pincus Ventures, L.P. v. Schrapper, 774 A.2d 264, 270-71 (Del. 2001) 
(requiring party to use Hague Convention procedures where it did not show “that true hardship would 
result if it is forced to resort to Hague Convention procedures to obtain discovery”); Ison v. E.I. Dupont 
De Nemours & Co., 729 A.2d 832 (Del. 1999); Candlewood Timber Grp., L.L.C., v. Pan Am. Energy, 
859 A.2d 989, 998 (Del. 2004).; Lluerma v. Owens Ill., Inc., No. 04C-09-122 ASB, 2009 Del. Super. 
LEXIS 214, at *27 (Super. Ct. 2009) (“Although such circuitous routes to accessing evidence [such as 
the Hague Convention procedures] are somewhat cumbersome, and would place most of the burden on 
defendants, this factor does not present the defendants with an overwhelming hardship.” (some internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 141.  Parra v. Cont'l Tire N. Am., Inc., 213 P.3d 361, 365-66 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
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excused from Delaware courts.142 In New Jersey, a party must show that 
they have made an attempt to obtain discovery, through the Hague 
Convention or otherwise, before filing a motion to dismiss based on forum 
non conveniens.143 In Pennsylvania, the treaty is not applicable unless “a 
party is . . . seeking the assistance of a foreign court in connection with 
discovery requests addressed to a foreign entity.”144 In New York the treaty 
is applicable mainly to obtain discovery from non-parties where the 
evidence is located in a signatory country.145 While no Oklahoma court has 
had occasion to decide an issue related to discovery requested from a 
custodian abroad, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has invoked similar 
preferences for plaintiffs’ choice of forum, even when little evidence is 
located in Oklahoma.146 This widespread state judicial preference in favor 
of plaintiffs’ choice of forum is especially important given the presumptive 
enforceability of choice of forum and choice of law clauses many 
Oklahoma citizens include in their contracts. The ability of state judges to 
interpret treaties, use and apply customary international law, and otherwise 
engage with international law-making plays a key role in giving effect to a 
broad set of underlying state legislative objectives, including private 
 
 142.  See In re Asbestos Litigation, 623 A.2d 546, 549-50 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (rejecting Finnish 
defendants’ argument that production of documents located in Finland must be accomplished through 
the Hague Evidence Convention); Wright v. Am. Home Prods., 768 A.2d 518, 536-37 (Del. Super. Ct. 
2000); Eisenmann Corp. v. GMC, No. 99C-07-260-WTQ, 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 25, at *33-36 
(Super. Ct. 2000); Varo v. Owens-Illinois, 948 A.2d 673, 684 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). (“If 
anything, it would appear that important evidence relevant to claims and defenses is located in each 
jurisdiction, and there is no reason to believe that the costs and burdens of litigating here favor plaintiffs 
to the detriment of defendant. And to the extent defendant suffers any burden at all, it seems equally 
shared by plaintiffs, and, in any event, may very well be mitigated by modern means of discovery such 
as videotaped testimony, telephonic conferencing and de bene esse depositions, designed to facilitate 
the gathering of evidence.”). 
 143.  See Kurzke v. Nissan Motor Corp., 752 A.2d 708, 714 (N.J. 2000) (“New Jersey courts 
should be especially accommodating to their own citizens seeking justice at home. ‘[A]n action by or 
against a resident will ordinarily not be dismissed as being in an inconvenient forum.’ . . . Although 
domestic residence is not decisive, ‘there is a strong presumption in favor of retaining jurisdiction 
where the plaintiff is a resident who has chosen his [or her] home forum. A nonresident's choice of 
forum is entitled to substantially less deference.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); Moake v. 
Source Int’l. Corp., 623 A.2d 263, 264-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (affirming trial court’s 
rejection of foreign defendants demand that interrogatories be served according to Hague Evidence 
Convention). see also Umana v. SCM S.p.A., 737 N.Y.S.2d 556, (App. Div. 2002) (affirming trial 
court’s denial of motion to compel based on Hague Evidence Convention). 
 144.  Volkswagen of Am. v. Otto Durr Beteiligungs GmbH, 37 Pa. D. & C.3d 165, 172 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. 1984). 
 145.  See Matter of Agusta, 567 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
 146.  See, e.g., Binder v. Shepards, Inc., 133 P.3d 276, 278 (Okla. 2006) (the chosen forum would 
‘establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff's 
convenience,’ or when the ‘chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the 
court's own administrative and legal problems,’ may the court exercise its discretion to dismiss the 
case.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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ordering. 
III. CONTRACTS 
State judges in Oklahoma and elsewhere frequently face questions of 
treaty application and the relevance of customary international law for a 
range of contracting regimes. The Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (Warsaw 
Convention) and the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air (Montreal Convention) govern 
contracts between state residents and international air carriers; state judges 
frequently interpret these treaties using both persuasive and binding federal 
authority as well as secondary sources originating from the treaty’s 
negotiating history. State judges frequently interpret treaty terms using 
state law147 to limit or extend the treaties’ application,148 or shape 
evidentiary and procedural burdens that adapt the treaties to the existing 
rules of contract construction prevailing in a state.149 State judges regularly 
construe the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions using both persuasive and 
binding authority from federal courts,150 and engage in iterative dialogue 
with them.151 Less frequently, state judges interpret the Convention on the 
 
 147.  See, e.g., D’Arrigo v. Alitalia, 745 N.Y.S.2d 816, 818 (Civ. Ct. 2002) (“Since the Warsaw 
Convention does not specifically define the word “writing,” the court will look to New York law for 
guidance.”). 
 148.  See, e.g., Koehler v. SAS, 674 N.E.2d 112, 116-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Zuliana de Aviacion 
v. Herrera, 763 So.2d 499, 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3 Dist. 2000) (“[The plaintiffs] were turned over to 
the National Guard and taken to a restroom in the terminal where the National Guard performed the 
strip search. As this occurred after disembarkation, the Warsaw Convention does not apply.”); Malek v. 
Air France, 827 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2006) (citing Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 433 
F.Supp.2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)); N.Trust Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 491 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1985) (“We conclude that article 17 of the Convention does not apply to this case because there was no 
accident, but that the plaintiffs may bring a cause of action against the air carrier under traditional 
common law rules.”). 
 149.  See, e.g., Manion v. Pan Am. World Airways, 55 N.Y.2d 398, 405-06 (N.Y. 1982) (The 
“assertion of the Convention’s liability limitations is an affirmative defense [and] the party asserting the 
defense generally bears the burden of proof.”); Kodak v. Am. Airlines, 805 N.Y.S.2d 223, 225 (N.Y. 
App. Div.1982) (“An air carrier’s failure to prove delivery of the passenger ticket precludes it from 
invoking the Convention’s limitation of liability.”); Am. Airlines v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 731 
So.2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding recovery of attorneys’ fees under state statute permissible 
as long as overall damage cap imposed by Warsaw Convention not exceeded). 
 150.  See, e.g., Schmoldt Importing Co. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 767 P.2d 411, 412-16 
(Okla. 1989) (applying Warsaw Convention to claim by Oklahoma resident); Berson v. Delta Air Lines, 
No. 095012616, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2089, at *3-4 (Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2010) (finding no 
liability under Montreal Convention which supplemented Warsaw Convention). 
 151.  E. Airlines v. King, 557 So.2d 574, 575 (Fla. 1990) (“The related cases in federal court were 
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. That court relied on the [Florida appellate court’s] 
decision in King to uphold the state claim for mental distress but noted that the issue was pending in this 
court.”). 
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Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 
Convention), which provides common standards for court recognition and 
enforcement of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards. 152 More 
importantly, state judges interpret contracts in which the parties themselves 
have agreed on the application of customary international law or a 
particular treaty. 
A. Contracts which Specify both a State Forum and Choice of International 
Law 
Oklahoma businesses engaged in international commerce regularly 
adopt contracts that include both choice of forum and choice of law 
clauses, the application of which are implicated by legislative mandates 
that may affect their enforceability. Under Oklahoma law, both choice of 
law and choice of forum clauses are presumptively enforceable.153 Indeed, 
the Oklahoma legislature has specifically required that its judges interpret 
all contracts using the same rules, to give effect to the mutual intent of the 
parties, to resort to the language of the contract and to give effect to every 
provision of a contract if possible.154 In short, the Oklahoma legislature, as 
many states, strongly favors the predictability and stability that facilitate 
private ordering.155 
In many contexts, international law facilitates rather than obstructs 
this legislative policy. For example, the International Association of 
Drilling Contractors (“IADC”) is a world-wide drilling contractor trade 
organization, which, among other activities, drafts and distributes standard 
contract forms.156 While these contracts, which tend to favor drilling 
contractors over operators, are frequently negotiated and re-drafted, they 
nevertheless contain forum selection, choice of law, and industry standard 
 
 152.  Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 77 N.Y.2d 225, 228 (N.Y. 1990) (“We conclude that the 
Convention, as a United States treaty, preempts conflicting Federal and State law, but that it excepts the 
Superintendent from arbitration in this case and allows him to proceed against Ardra in the main action. 
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Appellate Division.”). 
 153.  Adams v. Bay, Ltd., 60 P.3d 509, 510-11(Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (“A forum selection clause 
acts as a stipulation wherein the parties ask the court to give effect to their agreement by declining to 
exercise its jurisdiction. Absent compelling reasons otherwise, forum selection clauses are enforceable . 
. . A party who brings suit in a forum other than the selected forum bears the burden of persuading the 
court that enforcement of the forum clause would be unfair or unreasonable); see generally Campbell v. 
American Int'l. Grp., Inc., 976 P.2d 1102 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999) (applying German law). 
 154.  See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 151 et. seq. (1993). 
 155.  Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77, 95 (2009) (“While 
there is not a strict logical connection between General Contract Law and a preference for private 
ordering, there is a strong contingent and historical connection.”). 
 156.  Lisa B. Brown & Harold J. Flanagan, Onshore Drilling Contracts, Avoiding the Pitfalls of 
Form Drilling Contracts, available at http://www.liskow.com/PublicationFiles/Flanagan.pdf. 
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provisions that implicate the use and application of international law.157 For 
example, the IADC standard form contract requires that the parties abide 
by specific operating procedures as set forth in prevailing statutory and 
administrative rules, but where operating procedures are not addressed, 
parties must use standard industry practice as documented in IADC 
publications.158 That standard, in turn, is assessed as a function of 
international, not state or national, practices in the industry.159 These 
contracts often specify that actions arising out of the contract must be 
brought in an Oklahoma forum.160 
While no definitive empirical study of these provisions in Oklahoma 
contracts exists, there is some evidence to suggest that they occur in 
industries as varied as banking,161 insurance contracts,162 natural gas 
extraction,163 telecommunications,164 and, with respect to employment 
 
 157.  Owen L. Anderson, The Anatomy of an Oil and Gas Drilling Contract, 25 TULSA L.J. 359, 
364 (1990). 
 158.  See Dupre v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 473, 480 (E.D. La. 1996).  
 159.  INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRILLING CONTRACTORS - HEAT, SAFETY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CASE GUIDELINES, http://www.iadc.org/hsecase/index.html (last visited September 
20, 2012). See also Contract between Harken Energy and Parker Drilling Company, available at 
http://contracts.onecle.com/harken/parker.svc.1997.07.22.shtml. (“CONTRACTOR'S STANDARD OF 
PERFORMANCE – CONTRACTOR warrants that the operation and maintenance of Contractor's 
Equipment will be performed safely and in good and workmanlike manner in accordance with accepted 
international oilfield practices and in compliance with all applicable laws, rules and regulations in effect 
as of the effective date of this Contract . . . CONTRACTOR further covenants, warrants and represents 
that all work performed by it hereunder shall be conducted in accordance with accepted international 
safety regulations.”). 
 160.  See Quicksilver Res. Inc. v. Eagle Drilling, L.L.C., No. H-08-0868, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
39863, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2011) (“GOVERNING LAW: This contract shall be construed, 
governed, interpreted, enforced and litigated, and the relations between the parties determined in 
accordance with the laws of County of Cleveland, State of Oklahoma.”). 
 161.  See, e.g., DR Oil Ltd. P’ship. v. Bank of Oklahoma, No. 4:10cv01265 BSM, 2011 WL 
1884161, at *1 (W.D. Ark. May 18, 2011) (“Each forum selection clause establishes that if a lawsuit is 
initiated, it must be brought in Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma.”). 
 162.  See, e.g., Pyramid Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Providence Prop. and Casualty Ins. Co., 433 Fed. 
Appx. 687, (N.D. Fla. 2009) (“The parties agree that any legal action, suit or proceeding relating to this 
Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby, shall be instituted in a federal or state court sitting 
in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, which shall be the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of said legal 
proceedings.”). 
 163.  See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, http://www.chk.com/pages/ 
terms.aspx (last visited September 20, 2012). (“If federal jurisdiction exists over any action, suit or 
proceeding arising out of or in any way connected with any claim involving Chesapeake, you agree that 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma has exclusive jurisdiction. When 
federal jurisdiction does not exist over that action, suit or proceeding, you and Chesapeake designate the 
Circuit Court for the County of Oklahoma, Oklahoma, for the exclusive resolution of that dispute and 
submit to the jurisdiction of that court.”). 
 164.  Cable-La, Inc. v. Williams Communs., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 (M.D. N.C. 1999) 
(“The contract provides that Oklahoma law governs all contractual disputes and that any lawsuit to 
enforce the contract shall be brought in Tulsa County, Oklahoma, or in the United States District Court 
HALABI_MACRO_PROOF 11/21/12(DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013 12:10 PM 
2012] THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AS STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARD OF FEDERALISM 99 
contracts, apply across a wide range of industry sectors.165 In one case, a 
major Oklahoma energy interest was negotiating the purchase of key 
replacement equipment when State Question 755 passed. The European 
seller used the issue to resist the buyer’s insistence that any disputes be 
resolved in an Oklahoma state court as it could not guarantee an Oklahoma 
judge would enforce aspects of the purchase agreement specifying the 
application of EU law.166 As the Association of the New York Bar asserted 
in its amicus brief before the Tenth Circuit, “by prohibiting the application 
of mandatory and voluntarily assumed elements of international law, 
SQ755 would render critical aspects of contracts unenforceable or 
indeterminable.”167 
B. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
As part of a strategy to increase export-driven job creation in the state, 
the Oklahoma Department of Commerce has established web-based 
support as well as international trade offices to facilitate commercial ties 
between Oklahoma businesses and foreign buyers.168 The Department of 
Commerce advises businesses to plan for a number of legal and strategic 
issues that face businesses seeking to enter new markets or earn contracts 
with new foreign buyers. The legal and strategic issues include export 
financing alternatives, regulatory and contractual legal requirements, and 
transportation methods.169 Along with the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
the Oklahoma Department provides general advice to Oklahoma businesses 
on import/export laws, customs inspections, and the U.N. Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.170 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
 
for the Northern District of Oklahoma.”). 
 165.  See T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Plant Servs, Inc., No. 06-CV-0089-CVE-PJC, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 78666, at *10-11 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 27, 2006) (enforcing Tulsa County choice of forum selection 
clause between electrical consulting firm and employee even though employee never covered 
Oklahoma). 
 166.  Anonymous interviews, (Feb. 20, 2011) and (Oct. 26, 2011). 
 167. Brief for Ass’n of the Bar of New York and the Islamic Law Comm. of the American Branch 
of the Int’l Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th 
Cir. 2012) (No. 10-6273), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072117-
AmicusBriefAwadvZiriaxUSCourtofAppealsTenthCircuit.pdf. 
 168.  Trade Training and Exporting – Exporting FAQs, OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
http://dev3.okcommerce.gov/v2/FDI-And-Trade/Trade-Training-And-Networking/Exporting-FAQs 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012).  
 169.  Exporting Basics, OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
http://www.okcommerce.gov/Commerce/About/rc/Exporting-Basics (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). 
 170.  The Importance of International Business and Export Counseling Assistance From the U.S. 
Commercial Service, EXPORT.GOV (OCT. 17, 2011), http://export.gov/oklahoma/oklahomaservices/ 
eg_us_ok_040500.asp. 
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of Goods (CISG),171 which entered force in the U.S. on January 1, 1988,172 
is similar to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in that it provides a set 
of rules which not only add greater certainty to international contracts, but 
also shapes negotiations over the parties’ substantive and procedural 
objectives.173 Many of its provisions represent compromises between 
commercial norms prevailing in the contracting states, and its force is 
driven by a transnational jurisprudential matrix of courts, arbitral tribunals, 
and scholarly commentators.174 
Because the U.S. Senate ratified the CISG as a self-executing treaty, 
its terms apply to international sales contracts when the parties are located 
in signatory countries and the parties do not explicitly opt out of its 
terms.175 While the CISG follows the UCC in most respects, it also differs 
in materially relevant ways. Article 19 of the CISG treats the “battle of 
forms” problem differently than the Oklahoma Commercial Code.176 
Article 19(1) provides that “[a] reply to an offer which purports to be an 
acceptance but contains additions, limitations, or other modification is a 
rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer.”177 The corresponding 
Oklahoma statute provides that “[a] definite and seasonable expression of 
acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time 
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or 
different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly 
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.”178 
 
 171.  United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) (entered into force on Jan. 1, 1988); 15 U.S.C.A 
App. at 49; 52 Fed. Reg. 6262-80, 7737 (1987); U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18 (1980) [hereinafter CIGS]. 
 172.  Status 1980 United Nations Convention on Contract for the Int’l Trade of Goods, UNITED 
NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ 
sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html. 
 173.  JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA 1 (2d ed. 2004); CISG, supra 
note 156, art. I(a); see also Delchi Carrier Spa v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028-31 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 174.  Joshua D.J. Karton & Lorraine de Germiny, Has the CISG Advisory Council Come of Age?, 
27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 448, 450 (2009). 
 175.  Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Construction and Application of United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 200 A.L.R. Fed. 541 (2005); see 
also MAIA – Terms, Conditions, & Refunds Policy, MARTIAL ARTS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.masuccess.com/legal.aspx (“Your order from this website or from MAIA's catalog shall be 
governed in all respects by the laws of the State of Oklahoma, U.S.A. without its choice of law 
provisions, and not by the 1980 U.N. Convention on contracts for the international sale of goods . . . 
You agree that jurisdiction and venue in any proceeding directly or indirectly arising out of or relating 
to the purchase of goods from MAIA not exceeding $4500.00 will be in the small claims division of 
District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma.”). 
 176.  Like many states, Oklahoma codifies the Uniform Commercial Code according to the code’s 
formal sections, so that UCC §2-207 is the same as OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A § 2-207 (2004). 
 177.  CISG, supra note 156, art. IX(I). 
 178.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §2-207 (2004). 
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Similarly, Article 11 of the CISG dispenses with the Statute of Frauds, so 
that a contract may be proven by any means, including witnesses,179 while 
the Oklahoma Commercial Code requires the contract be reduced to 
writing for “a contract for the sale of goods for the price of Five Hundred 
Dollars ($500.00) or more.”180 The CISG also eliminates the parol evidence 
rule, so that parties may resort to a wider range of evidence to prove both 
the existence of a contract and the meaning of terms.181 
Parties regularly opt out of the CISG and state judges regularly 
enforce the parties’ intent that other laws govern their disputes.182 Indeed, 
state judges have noted the importance of the convention for facilitating 
international trade and enforce the treaty where it applies.183 In Orthotec, 
LLC v. Eurosurgical, S.A,184 where the parties disputed the CISG’s 
applicability, the state appellate panel engaged in an extensive analysis of 
the underlying factual dispute as a function of both the CISG and 
California law to conclude that the appellant suffered no prejudice even if 
the trial court improperly denied that party’s request for CISG jury 
instructions.185 
As with the Hague Service Convention, state judges have also limited 
the treaty’s applicability where it appears that a foreign defendant attempts 
to strategically avail itself of the treaty, i.e., the parties’ agreement shows a 
 
 179.  HENRY GABRIEL, PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC) 36 (1994). 
 180.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §2-201 (2004). 
 181.  Filanto v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12A, §2-202 (2004).  
 182.  Frank’s Int’l, Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. App. 2008) (noting,“[t]he 
parties expressly agreed that the [CISG] does not govern the matters set forth in the agreements.”); 
BAAN, U.S.A. v. U.S.A. Truck, Inc., 105 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (in explaining the 
applicable law the court looked to the contract and quoted, “[t]he [CISG] shall not apply to this 
agreement.”); Technical Support Servs., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 856 N.Y.S.2d 26, 29 (App. 
Div. 2007) (In quoting from a section in the contract to show waiver of a right to jury trial, the section 
also included, “[t]he [CISG] does not apply.”). 
 183.  Promaulayko v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 540 A.2d 893, 897 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) 
(noting the “progress [] made to minimize the problems [in international trade] through such efforts as 
the [CISG]”), rev’d, 562 A.2d 202 (N.J. 1989); KSTP-FM, L.L.C. v. Specialized Commc’ns, Inc., 602 
N.W.2d 919,926 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (dismissing because the CISG applied to the contract but did 
not confer rights to the plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary). 
 184.  Orthotec, L.L.C. v. Eurosurgical, S.A., No. BC270958, 2007 WL 1830810 (Cal. Ct. App. 
June 27, 2007). 
 185.  See Orthotec, 2007 WL 1830810, at *2. (Cal. Ct. App. June 27, 2007) (“(1) the initial draft of 
the agreement provided for application of the CISG; (2) [OrthoTec] believed potential distributors 
would be uncomfortable with a treaty governing the parties’ relationship and discussed the matter with 
[Eurosurgical]; (3) [Eurosurgical] agreed to eliminate the application of the CISG; and (4) the final 
version of the agreement omitted any reference to the CISG and provided only for the application of 
California law.”). 
HALABI_MACRO_PROOF 11/21/12 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013 12:10 PM 
102 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:63 
lack of intent to invite the treaty’s application.186 For example, in Vision 
Fire & Sec., Ltd. v. EMC Corp., an Australian corporation sued a 
Massachusetts corporation for its alleged failure to purchase a certain 
number of smoke detectors where the parties never reached a final written 
agreement. If the CISG applied, EMC would be deprived of a defense 
based on the Statute of Frauds. While certain negotiations leading to 
EMC’s purchase of Vision’s product occurred in Australia with the 
Australian corporate parent, the court concluded that Vision’s Maryland 
subsidiary bore the closest relationship with the transaction. The court 
reasoned that the “CISG does not apply to the sale of goods between parties 
if one party has ‘multiple business locations’ unless it is shown that the 
party’s international location ‘has the closest relationship to the contract 
and its performance.’”187 Indeed, the ability for state judges to resort to the 
CISG’s negotiating history is crucial because it contains so many 
“proposals and counterproposals” which may support a decision shaped by 
existing state statutory or common law.188 
State Question 755, and other measures now circulating in other state 
legislatures, do not and cannot by their terms prevent state judges from 
applying the CISG (it is, after all, federal law), but they may deprive judges 
of international interpretive sources, including customary international law, 
and, more importantly, they cloud the certainty that both the UCC and 
CISG intended to give contracting parties. As Peter Krug phrased it: 
 
International trade advances vital sectors of Oklahoma’s economy, 
including agriculture, manufacturing, and natural resources development. 
According to the Oklahoma Manufacturers’ Association, firms in the 
state exported goods valued at $5.1 billion in 2008. In 2009, the 
Oklahoma Department of Commerce declared that “Oklahoma exports 
remain an engine of growth for the state economy.” Why does SQ 755 
pose a threat? It is because successful international business transactions 
require, and benefit from, a firmly-established legal infrastructure that 
provides adequate comfort — legal certainty — for those who wish to 
participate in the global marketplace. A seller of goods faces risks that 
something will go wrong with the transaction. . . . These risks become 
even more acute when sales are made across borders. To protect 
themselves, businesses rely on contracts that will be enforced, if 
necessary, by the courts. But when buyers and sellers are from different 
 
 186.  Vision Fire & Sec., Ltd. V. EMC Corp., No. 034305BLS, 2005 WL 705107, at *1 (D. Mass. 
Feb. 28, 2005). 
 187.  Id. (quoting WILLIAM A. HANCOCK, GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
CONVENTION, sec. 101.006 (2002) (finding that all the business dealings transpired in Massachusetts, 
including all price quotations, sales, and orders.). 
 188.  Karton & de Germiny, supra note 159, at 461. 
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countries, questions will arise about the proper body of law for the court 
to apply. Here, Oklahoma courts and contracting parties benefit from 
established precedent and decades of experience in deciding these 
matters. In some cases, like all U.S. courts, they must apply an 
international treaty on contracts for the sale of goods in order to do this. 
By prohibiting Oklahoma courts from considering . . . international law, 
SQ 755 threatens to undermine this system of precedent and the 
contractual expectations of businesses and their foreign partners.189 
 
Thus, the broader executive and legislative objectives promoting 
Oklahoma’s integration into international commerce are correspondingly 
advanced not by limiting state judges’ ability to use international law, but 
rather by applying that law where its citizens choose it to govern their 
contracts. 
IV. CRIMINAL LAW 
Criminal trials in Oklahoma, as other states, are generally resolved 
without resort to international law. Yet police, prosecutors, and criminal 
defense attorneys do, with some frequency, wrestle with at least one U.S. 
treaty: the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.190 That treaty, which 
the U.S. Senate ratified in 1969, and which courts interpreted as self-
executing, requires that when a foreign national is arrested or detained, 
authorities of the receiving State must notify that person “without delay” of 
the right to have his or her country’s local consular officer contacted.191 
The consular officer may then facilitate legal defense, notify its citizen of 
additional rights or other advice and/or initiate diplomatic communications 
intended to minimize the effect of arrests of foreign nationals on relations 
between states. 
 
 189.  Peter Krug, State Question 755: An Unnecessary Harm to Oklahoma, THE NORMAN 
TRANSCRIPT, Oct. 2, 2010, http://normantranscript.com/opinion/x1760133151/State-Question-755-An-
unneccassary-harm-to-Oklahoma/print; see also In re Application of the Okla. Bar Ass'n to Amend the 
Rules of Prof'l Conduct, , 171 P.3d 780, 830 (Okla. 2007) (“The necessary relationship might arise 
when the client's activities or the legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions, such as when the officers of 
a multinational corporation survey potential business sites and seek the services of their lawyer in 
assessing the relative merits of each. In addition, the services may draw on the lawyer's recognized 
expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a 
particular body of federal, nationally-uniform, foreign, or international law.”); Allison E. Butler, The 
International Contract: Knowing When, Why, and How to “Opt Out” of the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 76 FLA. B. J. 24, 26 (2002) (“As an ethical 
consideration, Florida attorneys have the duty to act in their clients’ interest. Hence, even if a client 
insists that Florida law should control a contract, a practitioner should have enough knowledge of the 
convention to fully inform the client as to the pros and cons of its application.”). 
 190.  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Dec. 24, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 77. 
 191.  Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, From LaGrand and Avena to Medellin - A Rocky Road 
Toward Implementation, 14 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 27 (2005). 
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If the terms of the treaty are breached—that is, if the foreign national 
is not notified of his or her right to seek consular assistance, then does the 
detained foreign national enjoy an enforceable, private right of action in a 
criminal proceeding against him or her? If so, what is the form and effect of 
that right? On these questions, the U.S. Supreme Court and the United 
Nations principal judicial arm, the International Court of Justice, (“ICJ”) 
diverged over a period when the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
needed clear guidance on the validity and scope of the defense.192 In this 
context, Oklahoma judges, like judges in Oregon, Wisconsin and Virginia, 
fashioned remedies that minimized the effect of ICJ jurisprudence. 
In Breard v. Greene, the U.S. Supreme Court, on the narrow issue 
before it, determined that failure to raise a defense based on the Vienna 
Convention in a state judicial proceeding barred the use of that defense in a 
subsequent federal habeas proceeding.193 In that case, Paraguayan national 
Angel Francisco Breard challenged his conviction by a Virginia state court 
because he had not been informed of his right under Article 36 of the treaty 
to have the Paraguayan consulate contacted prior to conviction and 
sentencing, a claim he raised for the first time in his habeas petition. The 
Supreme Court’s decision was based on straightforward application of 
federal law: 
 
The Vienna Convention—which arguably confers on an individual the 
right to consular assistance following arrest—has continuously been in 
effect since 1969. But in 1996, before Breard filed his habeas petition 
raising claims under the Vienna Convention, Congress enacted the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which 
provides that a habeas petitioner alleging that he is held in violation of 
“treaties of the United States” will, as a general rule, not be afforded an 
evidentiary hearing if he “has failed to develop the factual basis of [the] 
claim in State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(2) (1994 ed., 
Supp. IV). Breard’s ability to obtain relief based on violations of the 
Vienna Convention is subject to this subsequently enacted rule, just as 
any claim arising under the United States Constitution would be.194 
 
 192.  The United States ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations’ Optional Protocol 
concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes in 1969, which gave the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction 
over “disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention.” Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 1, Apr. 
18, 1961, T.I.A.S. 6280. In 2005, the United States announced its withdrawal from the Optional 
Protocol as a result of other countries’ challenges to executions in the U.S. in which their nationals did 
not receive notification of their rights to have access to their consulates. The U.S. was the first country 
to invoke the protocol before the ICJ, successfully suing Iran for the taking of 52 U.S. hostages in 
Tehran in 1979. 
 193.  Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1998). 
 194.  Id. at 376. 
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The Supreme Court also clarified at least two aspects of the case with 
respect to international law. First, although Paraguay had filed a petition 
with the ICJ which had jurisdiction to interpret the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, by its terms, the treaty was to be “exercised in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.”195 Second, 
the Supreme Court noted, “neither the text nor the history of the Vienna 
Convention clearly provides a foreign national a private right of action in 
United States’ courts to set aside a criminal conviction and sentence for 
violation of consular notification provisions.”196 The U.S. Supreme Court 
strengthened both of these conclusions in subsequent challenges to state 
court convictions based on the failure to notify criminal defendants of their 
rights to consular notification.197 
In 1999, when Germany challenged U.S. practices under the Vienna 
Convention (the LaGrand case), the International Court of Justice 
determined that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations did confer 
certain “individual rights” to contracting States’ nationals as a result of 
Article 36.198 These rights included the right to challenge convictions and 
sentences based on violations of Article 36’s notification and 
communication provisions.199 The ICJ held that parties to the Convention 
“shall allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence 
by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in that 
Convention.”200 In a 2004 judgment issued in response to a challenge 
brought by Mexico on behalf of its citizens facing execution in the U.S. 
(the Avena case) the ICJ clarified that states did not have to overturn 
convictions on the basis of notification failure, but convictions and 
sentences required review in light of any specific violations of Article 36 
and the manner in which Convention violations might have affected the 
nationals’ rights.201 Moreover, the ICJ insisted that these review and 
reconsideration remedies flow from judicial rather than executive 
processes; executive clemency or pardon procedures did not provide 
 
 195.  Id. at 375 (quoting Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Optional Protocol 
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 36(2), Apr 18, 1961 [1970] 21 U.S.T., at 101). 
 196.  Id. at 377. 
 197.  See, e.g., Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 118-20 (1999); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 
U.S. 331, 337, 346-52 (2006); Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 198.  See LaGrand (Germany v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶¶ 77, 89. (June 27) [hereinafter 
“LaGrand”]. 
 199.  See id. ¶¶ 77, 86-89, 125. 
 200.  Id. ¶ 128. 
 201.  See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S). 2004 I.C.J. 12. 60-63. available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf. 
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sufficient guarantees, as the United States argued.202 
A. Valdez v. State: Incorporating Evidentiary, but not Preemptive, Effects 
from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
Oklahoma prosecutors faced the consular notification issue twice 
during the long period over which the U.S. Supreme Court and the ICJ 
developed these competing doctrines. In Valdez v. State, 203 an Oklahoma 
jury convicted and sentenced Mexican national Gerardo Valdez to death for 
killing Juan Barron during a drunken, late-night altercation over whether 
the Bible—according to Valdez—required him to murder Barron because 
of his sexual orientation.204 After the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
affirmed his original conviction and he exhausted remedies available under 
habeas review in the federal courts,205 the defendant argued that his 
conviction and sentence should be overturned because the state failed to 
notify him of his right to contact his consulate.206 Oklahoma state 
prosecutors argued that Valdez failed to raise the claim as part of his 
original criminal trial and therefore defaulted on the claim while Valdez 
asserted that the ICJ’s LaGrand judgment required that the appellate court 
grant relief as a result of the failure to notify the Mexican consulate.207 The 
case arose after Breard but before the U.S. Supreme Court could clarify the 
effect of the ICJ’s judgment in LaGrand.208 
 
 202.  Id. at ¶¶ 136-143; see also Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), Counter-
Memorial of the United States of America, at 109-121 (Nov. 3, 2003), available at http://www.icj-
cji.org/docket/files/128/10837.pdf. In its submission to the ICJ, the United States described former 
Illinois Governor George Ryan’s commutation of three death sentences named in the Avena case on 
account of these nationals not having received consular information required by Article 36. Id. at 114, 
n.247.  
 203.  46 P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). Like Texas, Oklahoma divides its courts between civil 
and criminal appellate chambers so that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals is the state’s highest 
court of appellate review for criminal cases.   
 204.  Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2000).  
 205.  Valdez, 900 P.2d 363 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). 
 206.  Valdez, 219 F.3d at 1227-28. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Intervening decisions from the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and other federal courts 
offered little guidance on the extent of the individual remedy available under Article 36. See United 
States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000). (“Contrary to the government's position, 
the Supreme Court in Breard ‘treated the issue of whether the provision creates any judicially 
enforceable rights as an open question, stating . . . that the Vienna Convention “arguably” creates 
individual rights.’”); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 
banc) (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998)); United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 
986 (10th Cir. 2001) (“It remains an open question whether the Vienna Convention gives rise to any 
individually enforceable rights.”); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam) (The court 
states that the Vienna Convention "arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance 
following arrest") (quoting Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 986). 
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The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals thoroughly reviewed the 
ICJ’s decision, but ultimately determined that Breard had sufficiently 
contemplated the role of the ICJ when determining that procedural default 
barred Valdez’s claims. Without binding its prosecutors to the ICJ’s 
judgment, the appellate court shaped its decision to give effect to the 
determination of the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board, which had 
recommended clemency: 
 
The Government of Mexico retained experts and experienced attorney(s) 
to assist Valdez. Through investigation of his background and medical 
history, it was learned Valdez suffers from severe organic brain damage; 
was born into extreme poverty; received limited education, and grew up 
in a family plagued by alcohol abuse and instability. Most significant of 
these findings, according to counsel for Valdez, is that he experienced 
head injuries in his youth which greatly contributed to and altered his 
behavior . . . . 
While arguments can be made that trial counsel could have requested 
funds to hire expert witnesses, it is evident that trial counsel’s 
inexperience in capital litigation caused him to believe such funds were 
unavailable. We cannot ignore the significance and importance of the 
factual evidence discovered with the assistance of the Mexican 
Consulate.209  
 
 209.  Valdez, at para. 18, 22 (“The State of Oklahoma insists Petitioner has procedurally defaulted 
this claim because it is not based upon new law, and this Court, under the limited review afforded under 
Oklahoma's Capital Post–Conviction Act, is not entitled to grant relief on that basis . . . LaGrand is not 
a “new rule of constitutional law that was given retroactive effect by the United States Supreme Court 
or a court of appellate jurisdiction of this state.” 22 O.S. 2001, § 1089(D)(9).”). It might be argued that 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Breard was a decisive interpretation of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, and therefore Oklahoma state judges were bound to apply it as federal law. 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court itself noted that it should “give respectful consideration to the 
interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret 
such” even if implementation ultimately belonged to the “receiving state.” See also Simma & Hoppe, 
supra note 176, n.185 (“Valdez's case received a lot of attention by international law scholars due to the 
correspondence between the Legal Adviser for the United States State Department, William H. Taft, 
and Governor Keating of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma State Pardon and Parole Board in 2001. In a first 
set of letters Taft asked the Governor and the Parole Board respectively to give careful consideration to 
the pending clemency request. The Parole board at that point recommended to commute Valdez's 
sentence to life in prison without the possibility of parole, and Governor Keating issued a thirty-day 
stay of Valdez's execution. About a week later, when the ICJ had rendered its judgment in LaGrand, 
Taft once again sent a letter to Governor Keating, this time asking him to specifically consider the 
question whether Valdez had been prejudiced by the violation of his Article 36 rights. On July 20, 2001, 
Governor Keating denied the clemency petition, concluding that the violation of article 36 had had no 
prejudicial effect on Valdez's conviction or sentence. On August 17, however, the Governor granted 
another stay of execution to allow Valdez to pursue once more a claim for postconviction relief before 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Valdez's claim succeeded, and his sentence was indeed 
finally converted into one of life in prison without the possibility of parole. In this (second) hearing on 
postconviction relief, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, however, explicitly refused to discuss 
Valdez's claim in terms of the Vienna Convention. The court based its decision exclusively on the fact 
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The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected any reading of 
Valdez which might conflate the ICJ’s judgment with preemptive federal 
common law or even subsequently binding state law. The appellate court 
instead remanded the case for resentencing based on its general statutory 
power to set aside a sentence for “a miscarriage of justice . . .”210 State 
judges in Virginia and Wisconsin similarly dismissed any binding effect of 
ICJ jurisprudence.211 The Oregon Supreme Court also concluded that the 
Vienna Convention conferred no individual rights without citing the ICJ’s 
judgments.212 
B. Torres v. State: Defining “Prejudice” under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations under State, not Federal or International, Law 
Just as the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals considered Gerardo 
Valdez’s claim after Breard but before LaGrand, the court also faced the 
meaning of “prejudice” after the ICJ had issued a judgment interpreting 
that principle under the Vienna Convention, but before the U.S. Supreme 
Court clarified it under federal law. In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon213 and 
Medellin v. Texas,214 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted state court 
interpretations that refused individual remedies under the Vienna 
Convention. The Court further rejected the ICJ’s judgment in Avena and 
Other Mexican Nationals as preemptive federal common law and also 
circumscribed the power of the Executive to unilaterally declare 
international law binding federal law. 
In Torres v. State,215 an Oklahoma jury sentenced Osbaldo Torres to 
death for the 1993 killings of Oklahoma City residents Francisco Morales 
and his wife, Maria Yanez. After Torres exhausted his state appeals and 
federal habeas review, he filed a subsequent challenge to his conviction 
based on the failure of state authorities to inform him, after he was 
detained, that he had the right to contact the Mexican consulate.216 The 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to the trial court 
 
that counsel for Valdez was ineffective, namely that Valdez's attorneys would have had to look into 
exculpatory evidence located in Mexico regarding his mental capacity.”). 
 210.  OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 3001.1 (1980).  
 211.  See Bell v. Virginia, 563 S.E.2d 695, 706 (Va. 2002); State v. Navarro, 659 N.W.2d 487, 493 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2003).  
 212.  State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 577 (Or. 2005). 
 213.  548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
 214.  552 U.S. 491 (2008).  
 215.  120 P.3d 1184 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). For the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ 
review of Torres’s case see Torres v. State, 962 P.2d 3 (1998). 
 216.  Torres, 120 P.3d at 1185-86. 
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for an evidentiary hearing on whether the failure to inform Torres of his 
consular assistance rights caused “actual prejudice.” The trial court 
determined that this failure had in fact prejudiced Torres: 
 
In finding that Torres was prejudiced by the violation of his Vienna 
Convention rights, the trial court used the following three-prong test: (1) 
whether the defendant did not know he had a right to contact his 
consulate for assistance; (2) whether he would have availed himself of 
the right had he known of it; and (3) whether it was likely that the 
consulate would have assisted the defendant . . . Under this test, 
prejudice is presumed if all three factors are present . . . The defendant 
must present evidence showing what efforts his consulate would have 
made to assist in his criminal case.217 
 
In upholding the trial court’s determination, the appellate court grounded 
its decision in the basic reciprocity guaranteed under the treaty: 
 
The essence of a Vienna Convention claim is that a foreign citizen, haled 
before an unfamiliar jurisdiction and accused of a crime, is entitled to 
seek the assistance of his government . . . The issue is not whether a 
government can actually affect the outcome of a citizen’s case, but 
whether under the Convention a citizen has the opportunity to seek and 
receive his government’s help. This protection extends to every signatory 
of the Convention, including American citizens. It is often impossible to 
say whether a particular action in a criminal trial could affect the 
outcome. However, it is possible to show what particular assistance, if 
any, a government would offer its citizen defending against a crime in a 
foreign country. That is the right and privilege safeguarded by the 
Convention. This Court is unwilling to raise the bar beyond that which 
the Convention guarantees. If a defendant shows that he did not know he 
could have contacted his consulate, would have done so, and the 
consulate would have taken specific actions to assist in his criminal case, 
he will have shown he was prejudiced by the violation of his Vienna 
Convention rights.218 
 
In the aftermath of Torres, a number of scholars suggested that the decision 
represented a triumph of international law prevailing in state court.219 A 
 
 217.  Id. at 1186.  
 218.  Id. at 1187.  
 219.  Alex Glasshauser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50 VILL. L. REV. 25, 70 
(2005) (“Unlike the brother in that case, though, the Mexican petitioner was spared, as Oklahoma was 
more solicitous than the Supreme Court of the decision of the International Court. After the 
International Court's final judgment, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ordered that the 
petitioner receive a new hearing.”); see also Simma & Hoppe, supra note 176, at 44 (describing Torres 
as a “welcome first.”); Reynaldo Anaya Valencia et al., Avena and the World Court's Death Penalty 
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closer reading of the decision suggests otherwise. The Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals in fact imposed a significant burden on the defendant—
proving that “the consulate would have taken specific actions to assist in 
[a] criminal case”—and granted Torres no additional relief beyond that 
already given by Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry.220 Indeed, Justice 
Stevens, in his Medellin concurrence, noted that the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals had undertaken precisely the minimal process that might 
be extrapolated from Avena.221 The Court of Criminal Appeals furthermore 
noted that its decision was “consistent with,” not required by, the prejudice 
standard articulated by the ICJ in Avena.222 State judges in Colorado, 
Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota and New Jersey adopted similar variations on the 
test, effectively hollowing out any substantive defense it might provide.223 
 The U.S. Supreme Court eventually clarified in Medellin v. Texas that 
while the ICJ’s decisions were still entitled to “respectful consideration,” 
its decision in Avena did not create automatically binding federal law 
applicable to state prosecutions.224 The Supreme Court also clarified that 
President Bush could not, without additional Congressional authorization, 
order states to comply with the Avena decision.225 If the history of the 
Hague Evidence Convention is any guide, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
 
Jurisdiction in Texas: Addressing the Odd Notion of Texas's Independence from the World, 23 YALE L. 
& POL'Y REV. 455, 491 (2005) (“The Torres case may provide a roadmap for the future. States wishing 
to heed the judgment of the ICJ can, through their court systems, order review and reconsideration 
hearings to determine whether a defendant was harmed by the failure to provide consular notification 
and access under the Vienna Convention.”).  
 220.  See Simma & Hoppe, supra note 176, at 39-42 (analyzing the significant burden the test 
places upon defendants).  
 221.  See 552 U.S. 491, 537 (2008) (Stevens, J. concurring) (“The cost to Texas of complying with 
Avena would be minimal, particularly given the remote likelihood that the violation of the Vienna 
Convention actually prejudiced Jose Ernesto Medellin . . . It is a cost that the State of Oklahoma 
unhesitatingly assumed.”).  
 222.  See Torres, 120 P.3d at 1188. (“Torres has provided ample evidence that the Mexican 
government takes its consular obligations to its citizens very seriously, particularly when those citizens 
are capital defendants in another country. The Mexican government has a tradition of active assistance 
extending back to the 1920s, and provided extensive assistance to capital defendants in 1993, the year 
of Torres's arrest. Had the consulate been contacted, it would have monitored Torres's case, consulted 
with and offered assistance to his attorney, and helped gather evidence, particularly in preparation for 
the second stage of trial. ‘[T]he protection of Mexican nationals who face capital proceedings or capital 
trials is one of the highest priority of the Mexican Consular representatives. All their efforts are focused 
on trying to avoid the imposition of the death penalty.’”) (citations omitted).  
 223.  See People v. Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d 155, 161 (Colo. App. 2002); State v. Lopez 633 
N.W.2d 774, 783 (Iowa 2001); Zavala v. State, 739 N.E.2d 135, 142 (Ind. 2000); State v. Cevallos-
Bermeo, 754, A.2d 1224, 1227 (N.J. Super. Ct, App. Div. 2000).  
 224.  Medellin v. United States, 552 U.S. 491, 513 at n.9 (2008) (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 
U.S. 371, 375 (1998). 
 225.  See Memorandum for the Attorney General on Compliance with the Decision of the 
International Court of Justice in Avena, (Feb. 28, 2005). 
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Appeals may, if given another opportunity, overrule Torres or limit it to its 
facts. As Janet Levit’s study on post-Medellin police practices has 
demonstrated, that opportunity may never arise. Police departments, state 
legislatures and state administrative agencies around the country have 
worked in connection with the U.S. State Department to ensure that 
arrestees are notified of their rights to consular assistance, obviating the 
need for judicial remedies.226 Oklahoma’s jurisprudence on the Vienna 
Convention is yet another example of how state judges adapt international 
law to limit constraints on state legislative and executive actors. 
IV. FAMILY LAW 
Over the last three decades, Congress has increasingly regulated 
family law—a traditional area of authority reserved to states—with a range 
of both mandatory and permissive legal regimes meant to assure certain 
federal interests.227 Citing the relationship between delinquent family 
maintenance obligations and federal welfare assistance, for example, 
Congress has imposed a mandatory regime under which states must 
actively pursue those delinquent in family maintenance obligations.228 With 
respect to child custody decisions, Congress passed the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) to eliminate so-called “haven” states—
states where a parent could take a child to obtain a more favorable custody 
judgment— by requiring state judges to defer to the continuing jurisdiction 
of any decree issued by previous state judge with jurisdiction over a case.229 
 
 226.  Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellin Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 626-27 (2008) 
(describing how police practices have evolved to include consular notification rights as a function of 
legislative and executive, not judicial, action). 
 227.  Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 269-70 (2009) (“Until recently, family law was viewed as the 
province of state governments. In the tradition of dual federalism, states were sovereign in this area, and 
the national government played a relatively minor role.”).  
 228.  Id. at 275-76, 282. (“Following its first ventures into family policy in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Congress claimed a more significant role with the Aid to Dependent Children 
program . . . this narrow focus began to widen in 1974 when Congress instituted a series of new 
programs to improve child support enforcement and paternity determination, protect children from 
neglect and abuse, and increase delinquency prevention efforts and improve state juvenile justice 
systems. Since 1974, these programs have expanded significantly, with Congress frequently drawing on 
sources of authority beyond its spending power to legislate in a range of family law contexts . . . As the 
AFDC program expanded and national politics shifted, Congress began to search for ways to contain or 
reduce costs.”) (citations omitted). 
 229.  Congress enacted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, and the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738A, to assist parents to regain their children when 
unlawfully taken by the other parent. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) reaffirms a 
court's duty to give full faith and credit to a decree rendered by a state court and provides that a court of 
another state must defer to the continuing jurisdiction of the state that rendered the original decree. 
Congress specifically invoked its Article IV power to effect full faith and credit between the states. 
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Although the PKPA itself does not provide mechanisms for enforcement, 
the Act makes the Federal Parent Locator Service available in all custody 
cases and makes the federal Fugitive Felony Act applicable to interstate 
child abductions.230 The increasing role of Congress and the President in 
these family law areas has facilitated the U.S. government’s engagement 
with a number of Hague Conference family law treaties previously rejected 
as encroaching upon areas of authority reserved to the states.231 
The U.S. has signed (but not ratified) the Convention on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of 
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, 232 and 
the Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of 
Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance.233 The purpose of 
the former treaty is to protect children in international situations by 
“avoid[ing] conflicts between their legal systems in respect of jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of measures for the protection 
of children” through international co-operation and promoting the “best 
interests of the child.”234 The latter treaty aims to effectuate the “recovery 
of child support and other forms of family maintenance” in the 
international setting by establishing a system of co-operation between the 
Contracting States that will ensure Contracting States make available 
applications for child support or other forms of family maintenance, 
recognize child support or other family maintenance orders, and effectively 
 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No, 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566. 
 230.  See Estin, supra note 210, at 305-06 (describing the developments leading to the passage of 
the PKPA).  
 231.  Id. at 279-80 (“State laws governing paternity, adoption, foster care, child support, and child 
protection now evolve based on a federal design, as do laws regulating the family behavior of 
individuals who receive federally supported welfare benefits. The cost of these programs to the national 
government shows a substantial federal commitment to family policy and children’s welfare.”); David 
F. Cavers, International Enforcement of Family Support, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 1000—02 & 1007-
—12 (1981); see also Gloria Folger DeHart, Comity, Conventions, and the Constitution: State and 
Federal Initiatives in International Support Enforcement, 28 FAM. L.Q. 89, 110 (1994) (noting that 
state governments can enter into compacts with foreign governments).  
 232. Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement 
and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children: 
Status table, Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=70 (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).  
 233.  Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other 
Forms of Family Maintenance: Status table, Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=131 (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).  
 234.  Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement 
and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children: 
Full text, Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=70 (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).  
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enforce the orders when necessary.235 As Ann Laquer Estin has noted, 
harmonization of these treaties with domestic U.S. law will be difficult 
because of “our approach to federalism and the traditional role of state 
governments in family law.”236 
The United States has ratified the Convention on Protection of 
Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague 
Adoption Convention). Congress passed the implementing Intercountry 
Adoption Act in 2000 although the State Department only finalized 
implementing regulations relatively recently.237 The U.S. has also ratified 
the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
(Hague Abduction Convention), implemented by Congress as the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).238 The drafters of 
the Hague Abduction Convention intended to address the increasing 
incidence of parents taking their children across international borders in an 
attempt to obtain more favorable custody determinations.239 The intended 
effect of the treaty is to return the child to the state of his or her habitual 
residence, so that that state’s courts may resolve any custody disputes, 
minimizing any advantage that the abductor might obtain from fleeing to a 
second state.240 While there has been significant litigation over the Hague 
 
 235. Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other 
Forms of Family Maintenance: Full text, Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=131 (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).  
 236.  Ann Laquer Estin, Families Across Borders: the Hague Childrens’ Conventions and the Case 
for International Family Law in the United States, 62 FLA. L. REV. 47, 50 (2010). 
 237.  Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption: Status table, Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). Estin, 
supra note 219, at 83 (describing the long process involved in finalizing regulations and depositing the 
instrument of ratification).  
 238.  See Ann Laquer Estin, Families and Children in International Law, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 276 (2002) (“Although the United States has participated in the Hague 
Conference since 1964, it has not ratified any of the marriage and divorce treaties, most likely because 
family law is understood in the United States to be a subject of state jurisdiction while international 
treaty-making is the province of the federal government.”).  
 239.  Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 
T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89. Pmbl. (determining to respond to “the harmful effects of 
[children’s] wrongful removal or retention and establish procedures to ensure their prompt return.”).  
 240.  See Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, in 
3 Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
426, 429 (1981), available at http://www.hcch.net.upload.expl28.pdf. (last visitied Sept. 18, 2012) 
("The framework of the Convention . . . will tend in most cases to allow a final decision on custody to 
be taken by the authorities of the child's habitual residence prior to its removal."); Karin Wolfe, A Tale 
of Two States: Successes and Failures of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction in the United States and Germany, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 285, 
290 (2000) (“Typically, the left-behind parent would then file custody proceedings and/or marital 
dissolution proceedings in the state of marital residence. The abducting parent would simultaneously 
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Abduction Convention in federal and state courts, there has been almost 
none under the Hague Adoption Convention. The Hague Abduction 
Convention is therefore the most important of the family law treaties for 
examining state judges’ behavior. 
A. Hague Abduction Convention 
 Under the Hague Abduction Convention, any person seeking the 
return of a child may commence a civil action by filing a petition in a court 
where the child is located.241 The petitioner bears the burden of showing by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the removal or retention was 
wrongful. The respondent must show by clear and convincing evidence that 
one of a limited number of exceptions apply.242 The Hague Convention 
does not authorize a foreign court to determine the merits of the underlying 
custody claim.243 The foreign court is limited to deciding whether the child 
should be returned to his or her state of habitual residence.244 The 
implementing statute grants to state courts and United States district courts 
“concurrent original jurisdiction of actions arising under the 
Convention,”245 a provision inserted over the objection of the Reagan 
administration which favored exclusive state court jurisdiction.246 The 
statute offers modest modifications to the treaty text, requiring simply that 
courts “shall decide the case in accordance with the Convention.”247 
While federal and state judges are prohibited from scrutinizing the 
“merits of the underlying custody claim,” the Hague Abduction Convention 
itself divides parental rights into “rights of custody” and “rights of 
access.”248 Article 3 of the treaty by its terms limits a “wrongful” removal 
 
file custody proceedings in the abducted-to state. Courts based jurisdiction on a variety of theories, 
ranging from protective measures to a transfer of habitual residence to inherent jurisdiction over 
nationals.”).  
 241.  42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (2006).  
 242.  42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1)(A)-(2)(A) (2006). Most often claimed is that the child's return would 
result in grave danger of psychological harm. See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063-64 (6th 
Cir. 1996).  
 243.  42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4) (2006). 
 244.  See Julia A. Todd, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction: Are the Convention's Goals Being Achieved?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 553, 554 
[Need Pincite] (1995); Marianne Blair, International Application of the UCCJEA: Scrutinizing the 
Escape Clause, 38 FAM. L.Q. 547, 549-50 (2004).  
 245.  42 U.S.C.. § 11603(a) (2006).  
 246.  See International Child Abduction Act, Hearing Before Subcomm. on Courts and 
Administrative Practice of the S. Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong. (Feb. 23, 1988); Linda Silberman, 
Hague International Child Abduction Convention: A Progress Report, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
209, 262-63 (1994).  
 247.  42 U.S.C. 11603(d) (2006).  
 248.  Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 222, 
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to one violating “rights of custody,” while Article 8 appears to similarly 
limit the return remedy.249 In Viragh v. Fordes, a Massachusetts Family 
Court judge determined that the Hague Abduction Convention did not 
entitle a non-custodial parent to assert a right of return for violation of 
access rights only. In Viragh, the custodial parent moved with her two 
children from Hungary to the United States notwithstanding a Hungarian 
court’s award of visitation to the non-custodial parent. When she informed 
her ex-husband that she would not return to Hungary with the children, he 
brought an action in Massachusetts Family Court seeking enforcement of a 
right of return under the Hague Abduction Convention. Reasoning from the 
text of the treaty, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed: “the 
Convention does not mandate any specific remedy when a noncustodial 
parent has established interference with rights of access.” Rather, nations 
are instructed in Art. 21 to “promote the peaceful enjoyment of access 
rights and the fulfillment of any conditions to which the exercise of those 
rights may be subject,” as well as to “take steps to remove, as far as 
possible, all obstacles to the exercise of such rights.”250 
The ruling, plausibly supported by the text of the treaty, had the effect 
of opening a narrow window into foreign courts’ custody orders as well as 
limiting the treaty’s most drastic remedy—return. It also influenced the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Croll v. Croll to limit the treaty’s applicability 
to violations of established “rights of custody.”251 The Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits adopted the conclusion of the Croll majority with the additional 
effect that “rights to access” belonged exclusively in state courts.252 In 
Abbott v. Abbott, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately rejected the division 
between “rights of custody” and “rights of access” where an underlying 
custody order granted a non-custodial parent consent to any visit outside of 
the country of habitual residence, but validated the Viragh approach where 
 
T.I.A.S, No, 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (“The objects of the present Convention are . . . to ensure that 
rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the 
other Contracting States.”). 
 249.  Id. at art. 3. 
 250.  Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Mass. 1993). 
 251.  Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 138 (2nd Cir. 2000) (“One such remedy is a writ ordering the 
custodial parent who has removed the child from the habitual residence to permit, and to pay for, 
periodic visitation by the non-custodial parent with access rights.”); see also Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspect of Child Adbudction, supra note 231, at art. 26.  
 252.  See Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 500 (4th Cir. 2003); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 
F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2002). But see Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 720, n.15 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(adopting the reasoning of then Judge Sotomayor’s Croll dissent); Linda Silberman, Patching Up the 
Abduction Convention: A Call for a New International Protocol and a Suggestion for Amendments to 
ICARA, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 41, 49 (2003) (“Federal courts in the United States have held that they do 
not even have jurisdiction to hear a claim for enforcement of access rights.”). 
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only access rights were at issue.253 
B. The Hague Abduction Convention as a Lesson in the Judicial and 
Political Safeguards of Federalism 
Notwithstanding some efforts of state judges to limit the treaty’s 
effect, state judges have not diverged in their interpretation of the treaty’s 
terms as significantly as in other treaty contexts. While it would require 
greater empirical study of judicial attitudes to explain the convergence 
between state and federal ICARA jurisprudence, the treaty provides several 
legislative and judicial lessons which may guide federal negotiators as they 
enter into more agreements which overlap or displace traditional state 
authority. 
For example, no serious interpretive divergence has emerged between 
state and federal judges when adjudicating affirmative defenses available 
under the Hague Abduction Convention. Once a petitioner establishes that 
a child was wrongfully removed from his or her state of habitual residence, 
a federal or state judge may still reject the child’s return if a respondent 
shows by clear and convincing evidence that: 
 
a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of 
the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of 
removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in 
the removal or retention; or  
 
b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to 
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an 
intolerable situation . . . [or] if it finds that the child objects to being 
returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is 
appropriate to take account of its views.254 
 
State judges do not appear to grant these affirmative defenses with any 
greater frequency than federal judges do.255 Indeed, as Thomas Johnson has 
complained, “with an approximately 90% overall return rate, both federal 
and state courts in the United States have given foreign parents and their 
 
 253.  Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1992 (2010). 
 254.  The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction, supra note 231, at art. 13. 
 255.  See Gary Zalkin, Note, The Increasing Incidence of American Courts Allowing Abducting 
Parents to Use the Article 13(b) Exception to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 265 (1999) (citing in equal measure 
state and federal courts narrowing the scope of inquiry under the affirmative defenses); Renovales v. 
Roosa, No. FA 91 0392232 S, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2215 (Conn. Super. App. 1991) (denying 
grave risk defense based on relocation). 
HALABI_MACRO_PROOF 11/21/12(DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013 12:10 PM 
2012] THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AS STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARD OF FEDERALISM 117 
governments little to complain about . . .”256 
In some ways, federalism safeguards are built into both the text of the 
treaty and the consensus behind its adoption. Both federal and state trial 
courts have noted the case-by-case inquiry required for a number of 
determinations under the treaty.257 The drafters of the treaty deliberately 
included ambiguities because defining certain terms, especially “custody”, 
caused disagreement.258 
Yet it also appears to be a treaty where the political safeguards of 
federalism are manifest and robust. After extensive consultations between 
the U.S. State Department and affected constituencies,259 Congress passed 
ICARA with strong support from both chambers.260 The same pressure has 
caused Congress to periodically revisit the Hague Abduction Convention 
and to address early evidence that other signatory states have not enforced 
the treaty with the same rigor as American federal and state judges.261 A 
similarly inclusive process governed the ratification of the Hague Adoption 
Convention.262 Unlike the Hague Service Convention and the U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Hague 
Abduction Convention disputes almost always involve natural persons, 
depriving state judges of one of the methods by which they have effectively 
narrowed treaties’ application: blurring corporate relationships between 
foreign parent corporations and domestic, state-law incorporated 
subsidiaries. 
 
 256.  Thomas A. Johnson, The Hague Child Abduction Convention: Diminishing Returns and Little 
to Celebrate for Americans, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 125, 130 (2000). 
 257.  Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1402 (6th Cir. 1993). See also Curtis Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 A.J.I.L. 675, 677-78 
(1998) (noting treaty contexts in which the federal government safeguarded state interests).  
 258.  Pérez-Vera, supra note 223, at ¶ 84 ("[S]ince all efforts to define custody rights in regard to    
. . . particular situations failed, one has to rest content with the general description given [in the text]."). 
See also A.E. Anton, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 
537, 550 (1981) (calling the grounds of refusal “a compromise”). 
 259. Estin, supra note 219, at 67 (citing Peter H. Pfund, Contributing to Progressive Development 
of Private International Law: the International Process and the United States Approach, 249 Recuil 
Des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 1, 25-26, 73 (1996)) 
 260.  See Ion Hazzikostas, Note, Federal Court Abstention and the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 424 n.13 (2004) (“Despite strong eventual support for ICARA in 
both houses of Congress, the issue of potential encroachment upon the role of state courts in custody 
disputes was contentious.”); Estin, supra note 219, at 103 (“Whatever the outer limits of the foreign 
commerce and foreign relations powers, both Congress and the Executive Branch evaluate federalism 
concerns before enacting legislation of this nature, and both branches have clearly understood the 
importance of coordinating our treaty obligations with the family law systems that exist in the states.”). 
 261.  Estin, supra note 219, at 75-76 (describing Congressional remedial action on the treaty). 
 262.  Id. at 90-91 (“[I]ndividual states began to enter reciprocal arrangements with foreign 
governments to establish, recognize, and enforce child support orders, following a trail blazed by Gloria 
DeHart, who negotiated many of these agreements as Deputy Attorney General in California.”). 
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In tandem with greater state participation and control over the political 
process leading to the Hague Abduction Convention, federal district judges 
have appeared to generally respect the significant state family law interests 
at stake. In many cases, federal district judges have invoked Younger or 
Colorado River doctrines to abstain from adjudicating Hague Abduction 
Convention claims so that state judges may protect important state family 
law interests.263 While federal appellate courts have been generally hostile 
to these abstention decisions, it may explain the synchronicity between 
state and federal judges on key aspects of the treaty.264 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that state judges play an important role in 
harmonizing international law with state executive and legislative 
objectives, limiting the disruptive effect of treaties, using customary 
international law to advance state interests and applying international law 
where state citizens choose it to govern their contractual relationships. In 
short, state judges contribute an important structural safeguard of 
federalism vis-à-vis international law. It is certainly true that state judges 
do not always subordinate treaties and customary international law to state 
interests. As the example of the Hague Evidence Convention shows, state 
judges sometimes give greater weight to treaties than federal judges do. 
State judges have also on occasion invalidated state legislative measures 
using as their main authority the federal government’s preemptive foreign 
affairs powers.265 As Anna Maria Gabrielidis has documented, state judges 
have also used international treaties and customary international law to 
clarify state constitutional law which often provides greater protection to 
 
 263.  See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Orange Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 
(2009) (“Federalism gives states authority over matters of marriage, family, and child welfare. This case 
deals with those interests . . . the state proceeding gives Ms. Witherspoon an adequate opportunity to 
raise the issues she seeks to raise here in federal court.”); Grieve v. Tamerin, No. 00-CV-3824, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12210 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2000) (holding that Younger abstention was appropriate 
where the petitioner had filed a Hague Convention petition in state court previous to filing it in federal 
court); Cerit v. Cerit, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Haw. 2002) (ruling that it was appropriate to abstain 
from ruling on a Turkish man's ICARA petition when he had already made an ICARA argument in 
Hawaii state court.”). But see Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriquez, 191 F. Supp. 2d 685, 688, 692 (E.D. Va. 
2002) (criticizing Cerit and denying motion to dismiss based on abstention). 
 264.  See, e.g., Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 895 (8th Cir. 2003); Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 
199 (3d Cir. 2005); Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2005); Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
 265.  Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (striking down California’s “buy 
American law” citing U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.); Mitsubishi Materials Corp. v. Superior Court, 113 
Cal. App. 4th 159 (2003) (invalidating California’s law giving WWII POW’s a cause of action for 
forced labor for Japanese corporations based on the preemptive effect of the U.S.’s 1951 Treaty of 
Peace with Japan art. 14 3 U.S.T. 3169, 3180 (1951)). 
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citizens than the U.S. Constitution.266 Yet the weight of the evidence, at 
least in the modern era in which the U.S. increasingly uses treaties to 
displace state law, suggests that state judges are blunting the full force of 
international law on state interests. 
I conclude with some parting observations and warnings about 
implications of this Article. State court detractors may use the evidence 
herein to support familiar arguments that state judges cannot be trusted to 
enforce the U.S.’s international commitments. 267 This is not necessarily the 
case. From the Founding, state judges have always enjoyed broader 
common law-making powers than federal judges and view themselves as 
more collaborative partners in the law making process along with state 
legislatures and (often, less unified) executives.268 If we take seriously 
Alison LaCroix’s argument that the judiciary became the “institutional 
focus of federal thought” at the time of the drafting debates, then we should 
expect state judges to exercise their judicial power consistently with a 
structurally imposed federalism mandate.269 
Even if one adopts a more skeptical view of state judges and their 
relationship with international law, then there are implications for the wider 
criticism now leveled at state judges from federal judges, scholars and state 
legislators alike. Constitutional initiatives like State Question 755 aimed at 
limiting state judges’ use of international law are directly traceable to 
federal judicial application of broadly construed preemption doctrines.270 
While the Oklahoma state legislature may not affect judicial behavior 
through clearly unconstitutional efforts like State Question 755, it may, for 
example, regulate state judges’ job security.271 Indeed, in states like 
Oklahoma, where trial, but not appellate, judges are popularly elected,272 
 
 266.  Anna Maria Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy Analysis of Litigating 
International Human Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 139, 179 (2006). 
 267.  Renée Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice System in 
an Era of Global Trade, 2001 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 229, 253 (2001) (“There is a large literature on the 
relative merits of federal and state courts. These scholars are addressing the question of whether state 
courts are capable of adequately enforcing federal rights and of deciding diversity cases. Many writers 
have concluded that state judges are quite capable of handling these cases; a sizable contingent has 
argued the opposite.”). 
 268.  Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 93 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013).  
 269.  LaCroix, supra note 14, at 750. 
 270.  Justice Ginsburg effectively advocates that position in her Garamendi dissent. See also El Al 
Isr. Airlines v. Tseng, 119 S.Ct. 662, 675 (1999) (“Our home-centered preemption analysis, therefore, 
should not be applied, mechanically, in construing our international obligations.”). 
 271.  Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial 
Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1143-44 (2010). 
 272.  Scott D. Wiener, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 187 n.38 (1996) 
HALABI_MACRO_PROOF 11/21/12 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013 12:10 PM 
120 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:63 
those seeking to abolish judicial elections, particularly partisan elections, 
face significant hurdles as state judges increasingly appear to play a crucial 
structural role in guarding against perceived illegitimate encroachments on 
state authority by the federal government. 
One need not sweepingly advocate direct, partisan elections for state 
judges in order to understand that states may use direct elections as a way 
to subtly but effectively assert their sovereignty in a legal landscape where 
state sovereignty jurisprudence is, at best, unclear. Framed within the 
context of international law—and the corresponding limitations states face 
for direct participation in international law-making—states’ continued use 
of partisan elections makes more sense. In short, the judicial and political 
safeguards of federalism may operate in a hydraulic dynamic; advocates for 
merit-based judicial selection in states will struggle as long as political 
safeguards at the national level seem inadequate. In an era where bilateral 
and multilateral treaties increasingly regulate areas traditionally reserved to 
the states, state judges now play an important modifying role which may be 
rendered unnecessary given the right federal judicial and legislative 
protections. 
 
